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Abstract
The three chapters of this PhD thesis look at how heterogeneity and business cycles
interact. The first chapter features heterogeneity in the form of multidimentional tasks
in occupations, and the composition of job-to-job movers over the business cycle. The
second and third chapters focus on heterogeneity in consumption and saving decisions
over the business cycle.
Chapter 1 presents a jointly co-authored paper in which we match UK LFS em-
ployment transition data to US O*NET data on multidimensional tasks. We present
two measures to capture task and skill differences between occupations. We document
a set of stylised facts relating to the task and skill content of job transitions over the
business cycle in the UK. During recessions, the overall number of transitions decreases
and the task content of transitions becomes more similar both in terms of tasks and
overall skill requirements, relative to non-recessionary periods. However, we find that
the magnitude of all the estimated relationships is very small, and partially offset by
selection effects in the types of people who make job-to-job moves during recessions.
We do find that those who upskill tend to capture greater wage increases than those
who down-skill or whose skills are unchanged. However, we find no cyclical relationship
in the wage changes of those who up-skill, down-skill or with no skill change.
Chapter 2 describes the key features of a Bewley-type heterogeneous agent incom-
plete market models with aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty, the Krusell and
Smith (1999) model. It reiterates the common result that, in its benchmark form,
the model does a poor job of fitting the empirical wealth distribution. It shows that
this result is robust to large changes in the key parameters. I show that a commonly
x
used addition to improve this fit, dispersion in discount factors, implies a contradiction
when the model is calibrated to US PSID data before and during the Great Recession.
In particular, it implies that the preferences of agents shifted substantially, resulting
in a shift of individual policy functions for consumption. However, internal cyclical
dynamics of the model imply only a movement in mass along the policy function in
recessions. I also show that fitting the empirical fraction of individuals with zero or
negative wealth implies that the borrowing constraint should have loosened in the
Great Recession, contrary to empirical evidence that the availability of credit fell.
Chapter 3 takes the contradictions of chapter 2, and asks whether the increase in
the aggregate marginal propensity to consume could be explained by individual policy
functions for consumption shifting over the Great Recession. The mechanism I examine
is whether an increase in the variance of income shocks could have caused a shift in the
consumption function. This mechanism is also known to shift the consumption function
in the model of chapter 2. Using PSID data on consumption and income, I apply the
two-step method of Blundell et al. (2008) to first extract the transitory components
of consumption and income for individuals in a pre-recession and recession sample. I
then use an instrumental variables regression to estimate the marginal propensity to
consume out of transitory income at the income quintiles of the distribution. I find
that the aggregate marginal propensity to consume increased over the recession, and
that the marginal propensity to consume varies across the distribution. However, I
do not find evidence that marginal propensities to consume shifted across the income
distribution, consistent with consumption functions not shifting. This suggests that
increased variance in transitory income is unlikely to explain the contradictory findings
of chapter 2.
Lay Summary
The three chapters of this thesis look at the different ways in which taking into account
differences across the population or heterogeneity can matter for macroeconomic
analysis, in particular when we take into account those differences over the business
cycle. The first chapter focuses on how occupations can differ in terms of their tasks,
how individual characteristics interact with task choices, and how the composition of
workers can change with the economic cycle. The second and third chapters look at
differences across the population in the proportions of income that different people
devote to saving and consumption, and how this interacts with the business cycle.
In the first chapter, I present a work which was completed jointly with a co-author,
Aspasia Bizopoulou. In it, we seek to understand if there is a difference in the types of
occupations that people do when they are hired in good economic times compared with
when they are hired in bad economic times in the UK. Specifically, we are interested
in the task and skill content of occupations: tasks being a measure of the types of
activities an occupation requires that you do, and skills the level of difficulty at which
you complete those tasks at. Good economic times are those when the unemployment
rate tends to be low, employers are hiring and in general it is relatively easier to find
a job. Conversely, bad economic times are when the unemployment rate tends to be
high and it is harder to find a job. It stands to reason that people who are changing
their jobs in a bad economic period may make different decisions about the types of
occupations they are willing to take relative to good economic times. They may be
more willing to take an occupation which is different to their last job in terms of its
tasks and skill level in bad economic times, in order to avoid becoming unemployed and
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likely staying so for a relatively longer time. Alternatively, because the unemployment
rate is larger in bad economic times, employers have a larger pool of potential workers
to choose from. As such, employers might be able to be more discriminating about
potential employees, requiring them to show through previous job experience that they
have ability in the tasks and skills for the occupation in question. These two potential
effects of recessions work in opposite directions: employees tending to be willing to
make larger task and skill moves, and employers only accepting those who make smaller
ones. Determining the overall relationship is the aim of this chapter. We find that
overall, people that move employers in a recession tend to make smaller task and skill
moves than those who move in good economic times. Overall however we find that the
effects are very small, and we do not find a difference in the wages of people who move
jobs in recession versus those that change jobs in normal economic times.
In chapter two, I present a very influential economic model that is becoming in-
creasingly used in the economics profession. It seeks to represent the different decisions
that people make when choosing how much of their income to save and how much to
consume. It captures the uncertainty that people face in day-to-day life at the level
of the individual: they may lose their job or gain one. It also models uncertainty to
do with the state of the economy; there are good and bad economic periods. These
two types of uncertainty are also linked: you are more likely to lose your job in a bad
economic period than a good one. When people are constrained in how much they
can borrow, they have an incentive to save in order to make sure they have a roughly
equal amount to consume no matter the state of their employment or the economy.
This makes sense: someone who goes from being destitute to winning the lottery
overnight would surely be happier overall if they could have spread their winnings
evenly over their life. The components of this model taken together results in people
making different decisions depending on the state of their life. It also generates wealth
inequality, with some people ending up rich and others poor. It is well known that the
original version of this model does not do a very good job of fitting data on inequality
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at a point in time. There are far too few very rich people and not enough poor people.
A small modification to the preferences of individuals helps to bridge this gap. If we
allow some people to care more about saving for the future, and some to care less, this
generates more wealth inequality. Less well known, and the contribution of this chapter,
is that with this modification on peoples preferences, the model produces contradictory
results for peoples consumption behaviour in recessions. To show this, I take the model
to the data from the Great Recession of 2008 in the US. I find the amount of variation in
peoples preferences in order to fit the degree of wealth inequality in the good economic
times of 2006, and compare this with the variation in preferences to fit wealth inequality
in the recession of 2008. I show that this implies a contradiction: both the consumption
rates of people in the 2006-fitted model and people in the 2008-fitted model don’t react
very differently in a recession compared to non-recessionary times. However, comparing
the 2006 and 2008 proportion of a change in income devoted to consumption presents a
marked difference. In other words, the model with different preferences is not capturing
some change that happened over the Great Recession. I also show that, in order to
fit with empirical evidence on the fraction of people holding zero or negative overall
wealth, we must allow them to borrow greater amounts. This finding is contradic-
tory to both theoretical and empirical findings on the availability of credit in a recession.
In the third and final chapter of this thesis, I and ask whether we can find empirical
evidence of what happened in the Great Recession in order for the wealth distribution
to change so markedly, that would also generate those same effects in the model of
chapter 2. In particular, I ask whether peoples’ incomes becoming more temporarily
more risky over the recession caused them to change their decision of how much they
consume and how much they save out of a change in income. I describe a method
to extract changes in consumption and changes in income which were unexpected
and temporary from survey data on peoples’ total consumption and total income
over time. This involves controlling for the parts of consumption and income which
are predictable given peoples’ characteristics, and an assumption that people cannot
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perfectly predict the future. In particular, since it is a competing explanation, I control
for people who have limited access to credit. My analysis shows that it is unlikely
that peoples’ incomes becoming more temporarily more risky over the Great Recession
would have caused them to systematically change the proportion of a change in income
they devoted to consumption.
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Periods of increased unemployment entail changes to the reallocation processes of the
labour market. In particular, there is a well-documented pro-cyclical relationship in
the number of job-to-job transitions both in the UK and the US1. Yet, while there
many studies documenting how the number of transitions decreases in recessions,
comparatively less is known about what happens to the content of those transitions in
terms of the tasks and skills undertaken as part of occupations. Previous literature has
used occupational titles as a proxy for the content of occupations, finding occupational
transitions to be strongly pro-cyclical (e.g. Murphy and Topel (1987), Moscarini and
Thomsson (2007), Kambourov and Manovskii (2008), Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2014),
Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016)). In this chapter, I present a joint paper with Aspasia
Bizopoulou2 in which we break down occupational titles to actual job tasks and specific
skill levels, and show that this strong pro-cyclical relationship is no longer evident: the
cycle has little impact on individuals’ propensity to change their occupational content.
The intuition for why this research finds contradictory results is twofold. Firstly, we
are able to calculate the combined impact of recessions on both i) the probability of
changing tasks at all as measured by an occupational transition (which we will call
the extensive effect) and ii) the extent of the task change for those undertaking an
occupational change (which we will call the intensive effect). Using the McDonald and
1See for example, Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016), Murphy and Topel (1987), Moscarini and Thomsson
(2007) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2008)
2Senior Researcher, VATT Institute for Economic Research.
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Moffitt (1980) decomposition we can estimate that 45 percent of the overall effect we
obtain is the result of the latter intensive effect. Previous studies captured only the
extensive effect and as such tended to over-estimate the relationship between business
cycles and the task content of occupational transitions. The second reason for why we
find contradictory results is that there is a selection bias in the types of individuals
that change occupations in recessions. Using a Double Hurdle model, we are able to
control for this selection effect, which further reduces the magnitude of the overall
relationship.
In our analysis we focus on the part of the working population that makes
employment-to-employment (henceforth E2E) moves, which represents just over 50%
of new hires in the UK. This section of new hires is an important element of business
cycles since, adjusting for productivity, the rate of job-to-job transitions is a sufficient
statistic for the average real wage in the economy (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2016)).
Our analysis requires a way to quantify task and skill changes, leading us to focus the
first part of the chapter on presenting a suitable measure of change in task composition
from the literature which we modify to fit our specific purposes. We also propose a
second measure to extract skill level information from the task data. We then detail the
empirical methods used to understand the relationship between tasks and skill content
of occupational changes and the business cycle. Using unemployment rate as a proxy for
fluctuations in economic conditions, we estimate the relationship between an increase
in unemployment and task changes and the degree of skill change. Since the decision to
change tasks consists of two parts, namely i) the decision to change tasks at all and ii)
how big a task move to make, we decompose the estimates to obtain separate figures for
each element. Finally, we correlate the changes in up- and downskilling with observed
wage changes along different levels of the wage distribution. We find no significant
difference in the wages of new hires inside and outside of recessions. We argue that
this is due to the cyclical nature of task and skill changes being quantitatively small,
and being partially offset by the composition effects of the types of people who get
hired in a recession.
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Section 1.2 begins by discussing the literature related to this study. In section 1.3
we describe the data that we use. Section 1.4 presents the measures of task and skill
difference between occupations. Section 1.5 describes the econometric models used,
and section 1.6 reports the results. Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
Characterising an occupation as a group of separate tasks is a relatively recent but
already well-established practice in the literature studying job transitions. Among
applied papers, Poletaev and Robinson (2008) are one of the first to map occupational
titles to tasks from the US Dictionary for Occupational Titles. They study content
difference in occupational switchers, which they define as the situation when the new
occupation employs the previous occupation’s main skill with much lower or much
higher intensity. They find that wage losses are closely associated with switching skill
portfolio, in particular a decrease in skills. The key difference to our study is that
their sample is of displaced workers, whereas we focus on all job-to-job transitions. In
a similar vein, Gathmann and Schönberg (2010) and subsequently Robinson (2018)
construct a measure of occupational distance based on tasks, which we modify to use in
this paper. Using German administrative data, they find that individuals tend to switch
to occupations with similar task requirements, and the change in task composition of
occupational moves tends to decrease over time. Our work differs from Gathmann and
Schönberg (2010) and Poletaev and Robinson (2008) in that they look at the long-term
trends of task change whereas our concern is the variation over the business cycle.
A separate literature studies job transitions over the business cycle. Carrillo-Tudela
et al. (2016) look at the propensity for individuals to change careers and find that the
probability of a career change co-moves positively with the cycle. In addition, they find
that career movers receive higher wages than those who do not change occupations.
Devereux (2000) offers an early study of the cyclicality of task assignment, focusing
within the firm. He finds that firms tend to re-assign individuals to tasks of lower
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quality during recessions. Summerfield (2016) shows that recessions lead to an increase
in the share of tasks in the economy that are classified as manual. The contribution
of the current paper to this literature is to address whether individuals overall tend
to move to more or less similar jobs in terms of tasks during recessions, and whether
the direction of these moves in terms of the required skill level is affected by economic
conditions.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 UK Labour Force Survey (LFS)
We use the UK Quarterly Labour Force Surve (LFS) for the period 2000q1-2010q3. We
focus on this time period as our data contain a consistent classification of occupations,
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC2010) codes throughout the sample, and
it spans the 2008-9 recession.3 In the LFS respondents are followed over a maximum
of five quarters, and in each quarter a fifth of the sample is replaced by an incoming
group. For the majority of our analysis, we focus on individuals over two quarters
only, with the exception of the wage analysis, where we use the 5 quarter longitudinal
sample. The advantage of using the 2 over the 5 quarter is that we have a much larger
number of observations, on average 30,000 individuals per quarter, which allows us
to include a large number of controls for composition effects.4 We are able to study
job-to-job transitions that involve either no or a very small period of unemployment or
inactivity between employment spells.5
3While occupational classifications are available for the 1990s and 2010s, occupations are classified
according to a very different set of criteria. As such, when compared over time it is unclear what is
true variation in occupations and what is simply reclassification.
4Over time, the LFS has decreased the number of interviewed individuals. In the early years of our
sample, each sample has close to 60,000 individuals, while in the later years it drops to about 20,000
per quarter. All estimations and graphs include population weights so that the decreasing number of
respondents doesn’t bias the results.
5The individual may experience a period of unemployment or inactivity of less than a quarter
between spells of employment, given the nature of a quarterly survey.
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Fig. 1.1 O*NET Example Question
Example question concerning mathematical reasoning from the O*NET, source: US O*NET
Abilities Questionnaire
1.3.2 US O*NET
The US Department for Labor’s O*NET dataset is a highly detailed survey which
provides us with a picture of the tasks that are used in occupations. We standard
occupational classifications available in the LFS to match occupations to the US
O*NET. Our aim is to obtain a detailed task content and difficulty profile for each
occupation and to subsequently measure the distance between different occupations
based on similarity of task content and level of skill. We choose to map the O*NET to
UK occupational codes as, while some data about the task content of UK jobs exists
in the UK Skills Survey, the O*NET is much more suitable for our purposes.6
Alongside task data, the O*NET allows us to recover information on the required
skill level at which each task is used in each occupation. We refer to this as ‘skill level’,
since the O*NET gives us information about both the type of task in the occupation
and the level at which it is performed. To illustrate, figure 1.1 shows the question
6The UK Skills Survey contains both labour market variables found in the LFS and task data
found in the O*NET, however its sample size is too small for focusing only on job-to-job transitions
to run our estimations. For the task data, it would be theoretically possible to average over the
observations to get job content for occupations. However, the questions are much more qualitative
than the O*NET - variables include ‘Importance of looking the part’ and ‘how often come home from
work exhausted’; which, although interesting in their own right, do not readily map to tasks. It also
doesn’t cover all occupations because they are not sampled. Hillage and Cross (2015) use the method
employed in this chapter to map the O*NET to UK SOC codes. They find the method to be robust,
to create useful and reasonable data for occupations, and to accord with Skills Survey data in the
variables that feature in both.
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Fig. 1.2 Example of mapping the SOC2010 to the O*NET
The SOC2010 code that covers occupation ‘Economist’ is 2425 and also covers a number of
other occupations, including Actuary and Bioinformatician. Code 2425 maps to multiple
O*NET occupations. Taking an average over all of the Oral Comprehension scores for the
different O*NET occupations gives a score for the SOC2010 code.
asked for the job task ‘mathematical reasoning’. The skill level score ranges from 1 to
7. In this particular example, a skill level of 1 corresponds to “Determine how much 10
oranges will cost when they are priced at 2 for 20 cents”, and a score of 6 corresponds
to “Determine the mathematics required to simulate a spacecraft landing on the moon”,
the latter being clearly higher skilled. In section 1.4.1, below, we show the measures
used to ascertain the difference between two occupations and to separate out task and
skill information.
The O*NET contains task profiles for 974 occupations, which we map onto the
374 SOC2010 occupations of the UK LFS using CASCOT software, discussed below.
Since the number of separate occupation categories in the US are almost 3 times as
many as the number of occupational categories in the UK Standard Occupational
Classification that is used in the LFS, the mapping is not one-to-one, but one-to-many.
In order to get a single task vector for each UK SOC code, we follow two steps: first
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Fig. 1.3 O*NET Task Vector Example - Economist
Example task vector. The y axis lists all the tasks in occupation 2425 (Economist), the x axis
is a normalised score of the skill level required for each task. Black dots are the O*NET exact
matches for occupation 2425, red dots are the average values across the different possible
matches and constitute the final scores that we use in our analysis for this occupation. Source:
author’s calculations using US O*NET and CASCOT.
we use a confidence-weighted average over all matching O*NET occupations, where the
confidence weights for the mapping of O*NET codes to UK SOC codes are provided
by the CASCOT software.7 We obtain a mapping similar to the one shown in Figure
1.2, where SOC code 2425 (left panel) is mapped with 6 different O*NET codes (right
panel). Each O*NET occupation has scores for each of the 147 tasks in terms of
the level of skill needed to perform a job. In this example, we look at the task ‘oral
comprehension’. In figure 1.2 SOC code 2425 that covers occupation ‘Economist’ is
mapped with several possible occupations from the O*NET, including ‘Actuary’ and
‘Statistician’. Taking an average over all of the oral comprehension scores for the
different O*NET matches gives a single score for this task in the SOC2010 code, which
we then repeat for all possible tasks in all possible matches. Figure 1.3 provides an
7We use a confidence threshold of 70%, dropping any matches that fall below this confidence level.
A visual inspection of the mapping confirms that the matches are sensible.
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illustration of the average score for every task that is part of an Economist’s portfolio,
as calculated in Figure 1.2.
1.3.3 Matching the O*NET task data to the UK LFS
A crucial element in this study is the ability to match UK SOC codes from the LFS
with task information from the O*NET. To do this we utilise CASCOT (Computer-
Assisted Structured Coding Tool), a software tool developed by the Warwick Institute
For Employment Research.8 CASCOT is a computer program designed to make a
semantic match between occupational titles and standard occupational codes. This
mapping is created by comparing text descriptions of UK SOC2010 occupations to
text descriptions of O*NET occupations.
1.4 Capturing content changes across occupations
1.4.1 Measuring the Change in Tasks
To measure the change in task composition between two occupations we use the measure
of angular separation from Gathmann and Schönberg (2010), which has also been
used in the innovation literature (Jaffe (1986)). The measure of the change in task





(∑Tt=1 q2t,o) × (∑Tt=1 q2t,o′)] 12
 ∈ [0, 1] (1.1)
where o, o′ is a pair of different occupations, t is tasks, qt,o represents the skill level
of a task t within occupation o. Intuitively, the change in task composition between
a set of occupations o and o′ are compared by measuring the angle between their
respective vectors. The scores in the vectors range between 0 (this task is not used
in an occupation) and 7 (this task is used at the highest level), which we normalise
within [0, 1], so that the entire measure is within [0, 1]. Each occupation is represented
8More information available at https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ier/software/cascot/
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by a vector of equal length dimension and each element of the vector gives a task
score, i.e. the intensity with which the task is used in the given occupation. Some of
the elements of the vector are zeros, since occupations do not use all available tasks.
The way we apply equation 1.1 is different to the usage by Gathmann and Schönberg
(2010), in which they use data on the fraction of employees using task t in occupation
o to comprise qt,o. Their data only carries information about the composition of tasks,
rather than the skill level, whereas our task vectors include both. Therefore we develop
another measure, detailed below in section 1.4.2 which captures the difference in skill
level between task vectors.
1.4.2 Measuring the Change in Skills
In our dataset, since the length of the vector for each occupation is determined by the
difficulty - or skill level - at which the tasks is required, by measuring its length we
can capture the degree of upskilling or downskilling between occupations. We propose
the following measure, which takes into account the differences in magnitude between














 /√T ∈ [−1, 1] (1.2)
Equation 1.2 calculates the difference in length of two occupation task vectors and
has range [−1, 1]; -1 means that moving occupations results in complete downskilling
in every task, 0 means two occupations are equally skilled in every task, 1 complete
upskilling in every task.9 The measure is therefore symmetric, i.e. ∆SkillsAB =
−1 ∗ ∆SkillsBA.
9Theoretically, a value of 0 could mean that the two vectors do not have the exact same scores for
each task but the differences happen to offset each other perfectly. However, we do not observe this in
the data - i.e., no two pairs of different SOC codes return a value of 0.
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The Relationship between Skill Level and Wages
In using the ∆Skills measure, equation 1.2, we are assuming that vector length of
occupations is a good proxy for skill level of the tasks completed in an occupation.
If the measure is capturing skill level we should expect it to be positively correlated
with wages. To test this assumption we calculate the skill level for each occupation




2 , i.e. it is a measure of the vector length of
an occupation in the task space. We use this measure in a standard Mincerian wage
estimation:
lnwit = α + β1 Skill Levelo +
∑
k
βkXk,it + eit, (1.3)
where lnwit are log real gross weekly wages for individual i at time t. The vector
Xit includes controls for age, age squared, a dummy equal to 1 for female, years of
tenure in the current job and dummies for high, medium and low eduction. Skill Level
is standardised by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation to
facilitate interpretation. We use the five quarter LFS and take the wage to be the one
seen in the last quarter of interview. The sample includes all types of job histories
ending with employment in the fifth quarter of interview.
The estimation of Equation 1.3 can been seen in table 1.1. A one standard deviation
increase in skill level is associated with a 11% increase in weekly gross real wages. This
result suggests that our measure of the length of the vector as a skill difficulty proxy is
reasonable since it is strongly positively correlated with wages.
1.4.3 Two-Task Example of the Task and Skill Change Measures
Figure 1.4 provides an illustration of how the ∆Task and ∆Skills measures can provide
us with information about the content of occupational moves. We construct a basic
example in which there are a total of four different occupations (A, B, C, D) which
comprise two tasks: task 1 and task 2. Moving from occupation A, which is highly
skilled in task 1 and task 2, to B, which is lowly skilled in both tasks gives a change



















Table 1.1 Estimated Returns to Skills
Notes: Dependent variable is log real gross weekly wages. Esimated on the LFS 5Q sample of full
time workers using wages observed in the final interview quarter. Skill Level estimated from linked
O*NET data. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
∆Skillso,o′ of −0.86 reflects the fact that occupation B is much lower skilled than A.
Moving from occupation C to A represents both a change in tasks and upskilling,
whereas the change in tasks from A to D constitutes downskilling. Finally, moving
from and to the same occupation A results in zeros for both measures.
1.4.4 The Advantage of Using Task Data
Before proceeding to apply the above measure in our analysis, we take a moment
to highlight the advantage of using task data to characterise how the content of
two occupations might be different. In mobility studies, authors usually use highly
aggregated occupational codes, as in Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016) who use 1-digit SOC
codes, Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) who use 1- and 2- digit occupational codes in
the PSID. We argue that such aggregated measures seem to capture very little of the
content difference between two occupations. This can be seen anecdotally by looking
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Occupation move ∆Taskso,o′ ∆Skillso,o′
A → B 0 -0.86
C → A 0.07 0.5
A → D 0.29 -0.29
A → A 0 0
Fig. 1.4 An example of ∆Tasks and ∆Skills with 2 tasks and 5 occupations
at the occupation titles across different 1-digit occupations which can be more similar
than transitions within the same 1-digit occupation. For example, moving from being
a ‘Manager, food and beverage’ employee (5436) to working in ‘Textiles, garments
and related trades’ (5419) would not be recorded as a change according to the 1-digit
SOC definition of content change whereas the move to ‘Manager, public house’ (1224)
would.
Formalising this observation, figures 1.5 shows the distributions of all potential
within- and across-1 digit SOC code occupation moves that can be made in terms
of the change in task composition (equation 1.1). We calculate the change in task
composition of every occupation pair and plot the score in the left distribution if the
first digit of the occupation code differs (an ‘across’ 1-digit occupation move, which
is the type of move usually recorded as a ‘content’ change in the literature) or the
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right hand distribution if the first digit of the occupation code is the same (a ‘within’
1-digit move, which is not captured as a change in content when using 1-digit SOC
codes). If SOC codes capture differences in task content well we should expect the
across-distribution (left) to have measures of central tendency to the right of those
of the within-SOC (right) code distribution, which would reflect a notion of a large
occupational move or ‘career change’ when making across-code moves. However, while
larger moves are slightly more likely in the across-code (left) distribution, we see that
the two distributions are remarkably similar.














































Fig. 1.5 Task distance of potential occupational moves across (left) and within (right)
1-digit SOC codes (excluding zeros)












Table 1.2 Quantiles of task similarity of potential occupational moves across (left) and
within (right) 1-digit SOC codes (including zeros)
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1.5 Econometric Specifications
We use three different specifications to estimate the relationship between the economic
cycle and i) the size of the change in tasks of occupational moves and ii) the absolute
level of change in the skills.
1.5.1 Models Without Controls for Selection
4-digit Occupational Level
Our first specification is outlined below in Equation 1.4. We use a Tobit model since
our measures of change in task composition and change in skill level are continuous on
[0, 1), but with a large portion of the sample (approximately 40%) censored at zero.
Individuals censored at zero are those who experience a job transition, but don’t change
their occupation code. Individuals that do not change codes may still change tasks
since even the most detailed 4-digit SOC codes aggregate occupations into groups, as
was shown in section 1.3.2. Hence the data is censored, and an OLS estimation would
be inconsistent. Below we summarise the model:












δmIm,1 + eit) (1.4)
Here, i represents individuals; t is time; j are separate individual-level and job-level
controls, k are the number of quarters Q, l are the number of regions R, m are the
number of industries I; eit is the error term. yi is the dependent variable, which is
either ∆Tasksi when estimating the relationship between the cycle and the change
in task composition of moves or |∆Skillsi| when estimating the relationship between
the cycle and the absolute change in skill level. We take the absolute value of the
change in skill level since we cannot have an upper and lower truncation limit for the
Tobit equal to zero (as this would imply no truncated values). A subscript of ,1 or
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,2 designates whether the data is taken from the first quarter that a respondent is
interviewed, second quarter, and ,12 denotes both.
Our independent variable of interest is ut, i.e. the aggregate unemployment rate.
We add a set of demographic characteristics, namely age and age squared, marital
status, sex, level of education.10 We also add a set of variables related to the individual’s
current and previous job: the duration of the previous employment and whether the
separation was voluntary/involuntary or related to retirement, as well as controls for
whether either job is temporary, part- or full-time, self-employed, and in the public or
private sector. Finally, we have a set of controls for the method by which the individual
searches for new jobs: through a job centre, ads, direct applications, family/friends, or
some other method. The rest of the controls are a set of dummies marking quarters
to control for seasonality as well as a set of regional dummies to capture regional
differences within the UK.
1-digit Occupational Level
Our second specification addresses the concern that our use of 4-digit occupation codes
may obscure the phenomenon that we are investigating. Previous literature has used
much more aggregated 1- or 2-digit occupational codes to look at this question, which
make occupational change in general less likely, and large occupational changes more
likely. To illustrate this point, we graph the probability of occupation change, as
defined in Carrillo-Tudela et al. (2016), in which the probability of career change at
the k-digit (k=1,2,3,4) is estimated as:




where E2Ekm is the number of individuals that changed jobs and moved k-digit occu-
pation; and E2Eks is the number of individuals that changed jobs and did not move
10We split education into low, medium and high. In the low category we only include individuals
with no qualifications whatsoever; in the middle we include those with at least an Entry Level
Qualification and at most A levels (a UK pre-requisite for university entry); and in the high we include
all those with any qualification above A levels.
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their k-digit occupation. For example, an Economist is in occupational code 2 at
the one-digit level. If she changed occupations to become a Florist (SOC 5 at the
one-digit level), this would be classed in the numerator as an E2E move. If, however,
she became a management consultant (occupational code 2), this would be classed in
the denominator as a one-digit stay.



















Fig. 1.6 Probability of Career Change at 1-,2-,3- and 4-digit Occupation Codes
Five quarter moving average of the probability of career change as estimated as the ratio of
E2E movers that changed a) 1-digit, b) 2-digit, c) 3-digit, d)4-digit occupation to those E2E
that stayed within the respective occupational digit.
To make our analysis as comparable to previous results as possible, we also estimate
equation 1.4 with dependent variables ∆Tasksi and |∆Skillsi| aggregated to the 1-digit
occupational code level. To do so, we calculate the average potential task or skill
move from all 4-digit occupational codes with first digit j to all 4-digit occupational
codes with first digit k to be the task or skill change for any moves between j⋆⋆⋆ and
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k⋆⋆⋆. Moves from 4-digit code j⋆⋆⋆ to the same first digit j⋆⋆⋆ will have task and skill
distance zero. For example, a move from 1121 to 2462 has the same task distance, 0.07
(the average task change of all possible moves from occupations with first digit 1 to
first digit 2), as a move from 1221 to 2444.
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Table 1.3 Difference in Means of E2E Sample In and Outside Recession
Recession 0 1 Difference
Female 0·51 0·50 −0·006
(0·00) (0·01) (0·013)
Age of respondent 33·67 35·59 1·920***
(0·10) (0·31) (0·318)
Married 0·41 0·46 0·045***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·013)
Tenure (months) 39·21 46·93 7·719***
(0·49) (1·77) (1·624)
Full Time in Previous Job 0·71 0·73 0·015
(0·00) (0·01) (0·012)
Full Time in Current Job 0·76 0·75 −0·009
(0·00) (0·01) (0·011)
Temporary in Previous Job 0·15 0·12 −0·028***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·009)
Temporary in Current Job 0·18 0·17 −0·002
(0·00) (0·01) (0·010)
Self Employed in Previous Job 0·03 0·04 0·013***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·005)
Self Employed in Current Job 0·08 0·09 0·017**
(0·00) (0·01) (0·007)
Public Sector in Previous Job 0·13 0·16 0·023***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·009)
Public Sector in Current Job 0·15 0·20 0·046***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·010)
High Education 0·20 0·27 0·073***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·011)
Medium Education 0·73 0·69 −0·042***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·012)
Low Education 0·08 0·05 −0·030***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·007)
Search Method: Not Looking 0·92 0·91 −0·007
(0·00) (0·01) (0·007)
Search Method: Job Centre 0·02 0·01 −0·007**
(0·00) (0·00) (0·003)
Search Method: Applying to Ads 0·05 0·06 0·012**
(0·00) (0·01) (0·006)
Search Method: Direct Application to Employers 0·01 0·01 −0·000
(0·00) (0·00) (0·002)
Search Method: Ask Friends/Relatives 0·01 0·01 0·001
(0·00) (0·00) (0·002)
Other Job Search Method 0·01 0·01 0·001
(0·00) (0·00) (0·002)
Involuntary Separation 0·23 0·29 0·061***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·011)
Voluntary Separation 0·48 0·45 −0·036***
(0·00) (0·01) (0·013)
Other Separation 0·29 0·27 −0·026**
(0·00) (0·01) (0·012)
N 15514 1594 17108
Notes: Difference in longitudinal-weighted means inside=1 and outside=0 of recession for E2E
movers in the LFS 2Q sample. Recession periods defined using UK ECRI indicator. Signifi-




One issue that arises in the estimation of equation 1.4 is the possibility of selection bias.
Our population of interest consists of individuals undertaking a job-to-job transition.
Since the volume of job transitions decreases in recessions, the composition of those
who make a job-to-job transition in a recession is likely different to those who do so
in normal economic conditions. Table 1.3 confirms there are significant differences in
observable characteristics between the recession and and non-recession samples. Those
that make a job-to-job transition in a recession are older, more likely to be married
and have longer tenure. Fewer are in temporary roles for their previous or current job,
and a larger fraction are self employed or work for the public sector in either their
previous or current job. More are high-educated and a lower fraction are medium- or
low- educated. Fewer have quit (made a voluntary separation) from their previous














Fig. 1.7 Illustration of Double Hurdle model
First step: whether an individual changes jobs. Second step: whether an individual changes
occupations (whether they have a task and skill change.)
While we control for these observable composition changes in our estimations, a
question remains about whether this selected sample will bias estimates if there is
remaining unobserved heterogeneity. To explore this, we adopt a third regression
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specification using a Double Hurdle model developed by Dong and Kaiser (2008). This
model captures the intensive and extensive effects of recessions on job transitions,
illustrated in figure 1.7. The first hurdle, is a Probit model, capturing whether an
individual decides to change jobs or not. If they do not change jobs, their ∆ Tasks and
∆ Skills will be always be zero. In the second hurdle, if the individual has changed jobs,
they must decide whether to change occupations. If they change occupations, ∆ Tasks
and ∆ Skills will be non-zero. If they do not change occupations, their ∆ Tasks and ∆
Skills will appear as zero in the data. Note though, there is the same censoring issue as
discussed in section 1.5.1 - they may change tasks and skills but not occupation codes -
so for this second step a Tobit model is also the correct specification. Concretely, the
equations of the Double Hurdle model are:


























δ̌mIm,1 + λ̂t + ěit)
(1.5b)
Equation 1.5a is the Probit selection model which has dependent variable EE
equal to one if an individual changes jobs between the first and second quarter of
interview, and zero otherwise. Note that the control variables X̂ differ from those in
the structural equation, since we include only first-period controls for characteristics of
the respondent’s previous job. We also omit search method as only those that changed
jobs were asked which search method they used. The Double Hurdle model is similar
to the control function approach advanced by Heckman (1979), but allows the selection
and structural equations to be governed by distinct processes. As in a Heckman model,
we allow the errors of the first and second hurdles to be correlated. As such, to avoid
multicollinearity issues we also include the instrument Available, whether the individual
is available to start work in the next two weeks. The instrument for the selection
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equation is a dummy which captures whether an individual is available to start work in
the next two weeks. This will be equal to one if the respondent is looking for a new job,
is waiting to start a new job or would like a new job but has not yet started searching
and would be able to start a job in the next two weeks. This instrument is highly
predictive of the dependent variable in the selection equation - whether the individual
changed jobs between the first and second quarter of their survey. However, it should
not have any bearing on the size of the task or skill change that an individual makes
after changing jobs, the dependent variable in the two structural equations. Equation
1.5b is the Tobit structural model with dependent variables y∗it,2 either ∆Tasksi or
|∆Skillsi|. Contrary to equation 1.4, the y∗ includes observations in which an individual
did not make a job change, meaning a ∆Tasksi or |∆Skillsi| equal to 0. Otherwise this
specification is the same as 1.4, with the addition of the estimated inverse Mills ratio
obtained from estimating equation 1.5a, λ̂ to control for selection.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Changes in Tasks and Skills over the Cycle
To control for the changing composition of E2E transitions over the cycle, we estimate
the Tobit model of equation 1.4. Results are shown in model (1) of table 1.4. We
see that an increase in the unemployment rate of one percentage point is associated
with .02 of a standard deviation reduction in task change.11 The magnitude of this
relationship is very small. To put this into context, we estimate that the conditional
average of ∆Task Change is .04 12. An example of a move with ∆Task composition
equal to .04 is from 4159 ‘Fraud Inspector’ to 3533 ‘Insurance Underwriter’. During
the 2008 recession, the unemployment rate increased by approximately 2.5 percentage
points. The estimated standard deviation of ∆Task composition, conditional on the
controls listed in section 1.5, is .04 . An increase in the unemployment rate by 2.5
11-.04 times the APE factor, .62
12Conditional on the compositional controls listed in table 1.4.
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percentage points would therefore correspond to an approximate change of:
2.5︸︷︷︸
∆Xu






In our example, this would be an occupational move with ∆Tasks=.04 -.002 = .038.
An example of such a task move is 3532 ‘Insurance Broker’ to 4132 ‘Administrative
Officer, Insurance’. Both of these examples are small occupational moves, and there
seems to be minimal difference between the two types of moves.
In terms of the absolute change skill level (i.e. when yi = |∆Skillsi|), the effect
is in the same direction and of a similar magnitude. An increase in the aggregate
unemployment rate corresponds to a -.02 change in skill level.13 This effect is similarly
economically insignificant.
13-.03 times the APE factor,.62, table 1.4
Table 1.4 Changes in Tasks and Skills over the Cycle
(1) Tobit at 4-digit (2) Tobit at 1-digit (3) Double Hurdle at 4-digit
∆ Tasks ∆ Skills ∆ Tasks ∆ Skills ∆ Tasks EE ∆ Skills EE
Unemployment Rate -0.037∗∗ -0.030∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.049∗∗ -0.018 0.048∗∗∗ -0.0028 0.082∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.027) (0.033)
Female 0.042 0.11∗∗∗ 0.042 0.042 -0.19∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) (0.079) (0.030) (0.050) (0.050)
Age -0.043∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0098) (0.0071) (0.011) (0.013)
Age squared 0.45∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.11 0.52∗∗∗ 0.091
(0.089) (0.087) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.095) (0.15) (0.18)
Married -0.030 -0.040 -0.041 -0.041 -0.067 -0.0047 -0.097∗∗ 0.052
(0.029) (0.029) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.034) (0.047) (0.061)
High Education -0.25∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.11 -0.11∗ -0.19∗∗ 0.036
(0.053) (0.052) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077) (0.063) (0.082) (0.12)
Medium Education -0.069 -0.058 -0.042 -0.042 0.11∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.058 -0.20∗∗
(0.045) (0.044) (0.064) (0.064) (0.068) (0.052) (0.073) (0.087)
Tenure -0.026∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.011) (0.0063) (0.012) (0.014)
Full Time in Previous Job -0.25∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.048
(0.032) (0.032) (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.032) (0.048) (0.051)
Full Time in Current Job 0.070∗∗ -0.040 0.0051 0.0051 0.13∗∗∗ -0.022
(0.032) (0.032) (0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.038)
Temporary in Previous Job 0.050 0.040 0.060 0.060 -0.021 0.081∗∗ 0.0096 0.11
(0.037) (0.036) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) (0.040) (0.059) (0.068)
Temporary in Current Job 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.045) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038)
Public Sector in Previous Job -0.038 0.033 -0.063 -0.063 -0.089 -0.045 -0.0018 -0.14
(0.047) (0.048) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.053) (0.082) (0.10)
Public Sector in Current Job 0.19∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.049) (0.049) (0.040) (0.042)
Self Employed in Previous Job 0.39∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗ -0.018 0.12
(0.069) (0.063) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.058) (0.11) (0.14)
Self Employed in Current Job 0.27∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.046) (0.063) (0.063) (0.056) (0.053)
Involuntary Separation -0.083∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.060 -0.0052 -0.010 -0.048
(0.032) (0.032) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.035) (0.049) (0.061)
Other Separation -0.10∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.041 -0.053∗ -0.036 -0.069
(0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.031) (0.046) (0.053)
Search Method: Job Centre 0.23∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.071 0.045
(0.089) (0.087) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10)
Search Method: Advertisements 0.32∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.056) (0.075) (0.075) (0.063) (0.063)
Search Method: Direct Application -0.0054 -0.037 0.0044 0.0044 -0.17 -0.20
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15)
Search Method: Family/Friend 0.12 0.12 -0.058 -0.058 0.0056 -0.042
(0.17) (0.15) (0.22) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17)
Search Method: Other 0.085 0.20 0.37∗ 0.37∗ -0.16 -0.021





Quarters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industries Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 17130 17130 17130 17130 28592 28592
APE .64 .64 .47 .47 .42 .42
pseudo R2 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.0137 0.0223
Log llik. -21672272.2 -21568016.8 -20294343.9 -20294343.3 -34467.8 -34498.6
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(1) Tobit at the 4-digit occupation category level. (2) Tobit at the aggregated 1-digit occupation category level (3) Double Hurdle at the 4-digit occupation
category level. The sample in the selection equation of specification (3) is all individuals aged 16-64 years old over the period 2000q1-2010q3 and employed in both
the first and second quarter of their survey. The sample in all other other specifications have the additional restriction that individuals undertook a job transition
over two quarters (i.e., changed employers). The coefficient on age squared is multiplied by 1000. The reference category for education is Low Education; for Job
Separation it is ‘Voluntary’; for Job seeking method it is ‘Not Looking’. The regression includes seasonal, regional and industry fixed effects. Coefficients should be
multiplied by the APE factor to obtain correct marginal effect. Standard errors in parentheses.
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With the addition of task data to occupations, we are able to look not just at the
probability of changing occupations during recessions but also the extent of the change
of the task content. McDonald and Moffitt (1980) show that the marginal effect of a
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Of particular interest to this chapter is the relationship between the unemployment
rate and the change in task composition given that there is an occupation change,
i.e. the term ∂E(y|X,y>0)
∂Xu
, as opposed to the term ∂P (y>0|X)
∂Xu
which only measures the
impact on the probability of changing occupation and has previously been shown to be
negative and economically significant. Here, we estimate this change in probability to
still be negative, but it is not as large in magnitude as in previous research. This is
due to our definition of occupational change being much more granular, at the 4-digit
occupational code rather than 1-digit as in previous work. Using z ≡ Xβ/σ and the
cumulative normal distribution function F (z) ≡ P (y > 0|X) and dividing both sides
of equation 1.6 by F (z)βu, we can get the expression:
∂E(y|X, y > 0)
∂Xu
= πu ∗ βu (1.7)
where:
πu = (1 − zf(z)/F (z) − f(z)2/F (z)2)
is the fraction of the mean total response attributable to the response from those
who change occupations and tasks. We obtain the estimate of this fraction π̂u, by
calculating ẑ using our reduced-form estimates in ẑ = ∑Ni=1 F−1(Xiβ̂u/σ̂) as:
π̂u = 44.81%
14See appendix A.1 for details
15Note that, unlike the reported Tobit marginal effects in table 1.4, for ease of interpretation of
probabilities this decomposition is not standardised and so it sums to the unstandardised marginal
effect, -.001.
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This is a substantial fraction attributed to the intensive margin of those who switch
occupations (the extent of task change). It explains why studies look at only the
extensive margin of whether to make an occupational move or not will miss a large
portion of the overall relationship between recessions and occupational content changes.
Regression specification (2) in table 1.4 shows further that our results are not
entirely driven by our use of more granular occupational codes. Model (2) shows
the same Tobit model as (1) but with task and skill moves aggregated to 1-digit
occupational categories. While the coefficient on the unemployment rate is larger in
magnitude, as expected, it remains economically insignificant.
Regression specification (3) in table 1.4 further controls for selection bias using
a Double Hurdle model. Controlling for the selection effects of those who move
occupations in recessions, we see that the coefficient on the unemployment rate is
smaller in magnitude for both task and skill moves, and is now statistically insignificant.
In each specification control variables are, for the most part, significant, and in
a number of cases they are a magnitude larger than the estimated coefficient on the
unemployment rate. Older individuals (Age) tend to make smaller task and skill moves,
consistent with the idea that individuals tend to specialise over their careers. For the
same reasons, those with a higher relative to lower education level (High Education),
and those with greater tenure (Tenure) tend to make smaller task and skill moves.
Being full time relative to part time in their first quarter job (Full Time in Previous
Job) is associated with much lower task and skill moves in all specifications, and at a
magnitude of approximately ten times that of the effect of recessions. This suggests
that full time workers are much less flexible in changing the content of their jobs when
moving employers than part time workers are. Similarly, being fired from a first quarter
job (Involuntary Separation) is associated with much smaller task and skill moves
than quits. If an individuals’ second quarter recorded occupation is temporary rather
than permanent (Temporary in Current Job), this is associated with much larger task
and skill moves. Again this association is an order of magnitude greater than that of
recessions. The same is true for having a public sector rather than private sector job
in the second quarter (Public Sector in Current Job), being self employed in either
the first or second quarter of interview (Self Employed in Previous/Current Job) and
applying to jobs via Job Centres (Search Method: Job Centre) and Advertisements
(Search Method: Advertisements) relative to not searching for a job.
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1.6.2 Real Wage Changes
Table 1.5 shows the average of the quarterly time series of the real wage changes
for those that make employment transitions, broken down by period (recession/non-
recession) and skill change type (upskill, downskill, unchanged). We focus on skills for
this analysis, since if there is a skill change there has necessarily been a task change;
furthermore, the skills data allows us to separate into upskilling and downskilling
which will have contrasting consequences for wages. Since the LFS only reports wages
in the first and fifth quarter of interview, we use the five quarter sample for this
analysis. Necessarily the sample size is much smaller, which means we do not have
enough observations to look at the conditional wage distribution in terms of the
observable characteristics considered in section 1.6.1. However, we are able to include
job transitions that feature up to three quarters of unemployment or inactivity which
means we cover the majority of all new hires and should therefore be less subject to
selection biases.
We see that for the 25th percentile of the wage distribution, all job transitions result
in a decrease in real wages whereas for the 75th all transitions result in an increase,
a fact that is consistent with the literature on wage polarisation and sorting.16 We
observe that transitions resulting in upskilling have a higher real wage change significant
at the 5% level across the real wage distribution. For the median earner, this wage
change is approximately 3 percentage points higher for upskilling than downskilling, or
approximately 6 percentage points higher for upskilling versus unchanged skill. Note
that interestingly, downskilling tends to command a higher wage than unchanged skills
for the median worker, a statistic which is consistent with existing literature finding
that an occupational change comes with a wage premium (e.g. Carrillo-Tudela et al.
(2016)).
In the 2nd and 3rd panels of Table 1.5, we split the sample into recession and
non-recession to highlight the observed differences in wages for those changing the level
of their tasks during and outside of recessions. We run a set of t-tests for difference in
means in table 1.6 to test if the changes in wages are significantly different. We find
that mean wage changes are not significantly different within and outside of recessions
for those who upskill, downskill, or whose skills remain unchanged. This should not be
a surprise: our estimated relationship between the business cycle and task changes is
economically small and so should not be a factor in wage determination.
16See for example, Autor et al. (2003); Autor et al. (2008); Goos and Manning (2007); Goos et al.
(2009); Cavaglia and Etheridge (2017) for the polarisation literature and Groes et al. (2014) for sorting.
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Table 1.5 Real Wage Change
Percentile Whole Sample Recession No Recession
Upskill Downskill Unchanged Upskill Downskill Unchanged Upskill Downskill Unchanged
25th -6.97 -10.84 -6.03 -7.32 -11.67 -5.47 -6.75 -10.31 -6.39
50th 5.92 3.35 1.41 6.91 3.66 2.09 5.31 3.16 0.98
75th 30.74 23.69 12.36 33.82 25.34 13.53 28.82 22.66 11.63
Averages of the quarterly time series of percentiles of real percentage wage change compared to previous job over the time
periods listed. Using 5Q LFS survey, ‘Total’ defined as employment to employment transitions with a period of 1-3 quarters
of inactivity (EIE), unemployment (EUE) or direct job-to-job (EE). EIE not detailed separately due to small sample size.
Deflated using the UK consumer price index, whole sample 2000q2- 2010q3 . Recession periods defined using UK ECRI
indicator.
Table 1.6 Real Wage Change Significance Tests
Percentile Upskill Upskill Downskill Upskill Recession vs. Downskill Recession vs. Unchanged Recession vs.
vs. Downskill vs. Unchanged vs. Unchanged Upskill No Recession Downskill No Recession Unchanged No Recession
25th [5.99 0. ] [-1.8 0.07] [-9.33 0. ] [-1.21 0.23] [-1.79 0.08] [1.81 0.07]
50th [2.89 0. ] [6.44 0. ] [3.11 0. ] [0.83 0.41] [-0.01 0.99] [1.73 0.09]
75th [2.74 0.01] [8.96 0. ] [6.75 0. ] [0.93 0.36] [0.63 0.53] [1.94 0.06]




In this chapter I presented the results of a joint work in which we study the extent
to which the change in task composition of job transitions is sensitive to cyclical
fluctuations. We use data from the UK Labour Force Survey to study job-to-job
transitions and map occupations to their task content using the US O*NET dataset.
Using measures of task and skill distance we study whether increases in the unemploy-
ment rate are associated with changes in the content of the occupations of new hires.
Contrary to previous research, we find little evidence for an economically significant
relationship. Unlike previous research, we focus on observed changes in the task
content and skill level of job transitions, not only on changes in occupational category.
This allows to estimate the combined effect of both the extensive (on the probability
of changing occupation), as well as the intensive margins (the extent to which job
content changes), the latter being novel to the current research. We find that this
latter effect is much smaller, and comprises 45 percent of the overall effect. Taking
into account both extensive and intensive effects, we find that the overall association
of task and skill changes and business cycles is weak, especially when controlling for
selection effects. We also find that wage increases resulting from job transitions are
more strongly predicted by one’s starting point on the wage distribution and eventual
upskill or downskilling transition, and not by economic conditions. In the context of
designing policies to improve job search, it is useful to know that factors related to the
individual characteristics and job conditions are much more strongly associated with
task and skill reallocation in job-to-job transitions than economic shocks.
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I document the business cycle properties of the canonical model of
saving with heterogeneous agents, the Krusell-Smith (KS) model. While a highly cited
and influential paper, its popularity is due more to its novel method of solving an
analytically non-tractable problem than down to its realism in representing the world.
In this chapter I explore its shortcomings in terms of empirical realism - namely, in its
benchmark form, it does a poor job of fitting the cross sectional wealth distribution
both at a moment in time and its dynamics over the cycle. I explore a commonly used
method to fit empirical evidence about the wealth distribution: dispersion in discount
factors. When two calibrations of the model fitting the wealth before and during the
Great Recession are compared with the model’s internal business cycle dynamics, I
show that there are two contradictions. Firstly in terms of the distribution of agents’
marginal propensities to consume and second in terms of the availability of credit in
recessions.
The organisation of this chapter is as follows: in section 2.2 I discuss the context of
the KS model and other additions to it that have previously attempted to improve
its empirical realism. In section 2.3 I outline the major features of the KS model
and discuss a commonly used method to solve it. Next, in section 2.4 I discuss the
model’s results in contrast to representative agent models. Section 2.5 shows the
benchmark model’s wealth distribution versus empirical distribution calibrated to the
pre-recession and recession period data. Next, in section 2.6 I show the characteristics
of the benchmark model by adjusting key parameters. In 2.7 I discuss how to add
heterogeneous discount factors to the model. I discuss the contradictions of this
addition in section 2.8 and conclude in section 2.9.
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2.2 Related Literature
The Krusell and Smith (1999) model sits within a class of models known as Bewley
models, from Bewley (1979), in which agents face idiosyncratic earning shocks that they
can only partially insure themselves from. Other important Bewley models include
Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1993); in section 2.4.1 below I discuss these types of
models and establish the link to a representative agent Ramsey (1928) model.
A a well-discussed feature of the KS model is that, without modification, it does a
poor job of fitting empirical wealth distributions. Indeed, Krusell and Smith (1998)
note this themselves. There have been a multitude of extensions to the model which
attempt to fix its lack of empirical realism. One method is including life cycle effects,
so that in addition to a precautionary motive for saving, agents also save for retirement
or ill-health. Models also change the degree of market incompleteness in the economic
environment, such as unemployment insurance and other government programmes.17
These different additions have had mixed success. Krueger et al. (2016) finds that
the addition of life-cycle effects has minimal effects on the wealth distribution. They
also find that additions which reduce the degree of insurance over income variability,
or add idiosyncratic labour productivity risk, generate larger declines in aggregate
consumption than the benchmark KS model. However, Huggett (1993) finds that such
modifications imply an amount of wealth held by the poorest agents which is too low.
Carroll et al. (2017) adds permanent income shocks to the model, but finds that this
does not greatly improve the model’s fit. There is a large literature on heterogeneous
rates of return, including Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) and Quadrini (2000) which
include entrepreneurs as well as workers, which can better represent the large tail at
the top of the wealth distribution.
The focus of this chapter is on another often-used method for fitting the cross-
sectional wealth distribtion: dispersion in patience. This has been used in Krusell
and Smith (1998), Krueger et al. (2016), Carroll et al. (2017) and Castañeda et al.
(2003) among others. It is generally accepted as a relatively straightforward way to
capture the features of inequality across the entire distribution. My contribution is to
focus not on the cross-sectional performance of this model, but rather the dynamics of
the wealth distribution over the cycle. In doing show I show that the model exhibits
fundamental contradictions.
17Excellent reviews of this literature include Guvenen (2011) and Heathcote et al. (2009).
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2.3 The Krusell Smith Model
KS consider an economy in which there is a continuum of infinitely-lived agents of
measure one. Time is discrete, t = (0, 1, 2, ...) and each agent has preferences over









Because leisure is not valued, agents spend all of their time - each is endowed
with one unit - working when employed. Idiosyncratic risk is introduced through a
stochastic shock to labour input:
ei ∈ E =

1 for i = g, ‘employed’;
0 for i = b, ‘unemployed’.
Aggregate labour L combines with aggregate capital K to make production good
Y according to the Cobb-Douglas production function Y = zKαL1−α where α ∈ [0, 1]
and z is the aggregate state of the economy, which feeds through the model as a shock
which can take two values:
zi ∈ Z =

1 + δz for i = g, ‘expansion’;
1 − δz for i = b, ‘recession’.
Where δz is a calibration parameter. KS assume that the aggregate state, z and the
idiosyncratic shock e follow a first order Markov process with the transition matrices
πz and πe,e′|z,z′ , respectively. Following standard notation a prime signifies the next
period’s realisation, so that πz,z′ is the probability that the aggregate state transitions
to z′ next period from this period’s realisation is z. πe′,z′|e,z is the probability that
next period’s idiosyncratic shock is e′ and that the aggregate shock is z′ given that
this period’s employment realisation is e and the aggregate shock is z. There are no
markets for insurance against uncertainty, so agents may only undertake a form of
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self-insurance by investing in a single asset, capital, which is restricted to take values
k ∈ κ = [0,∞).
Individual Agent’s Problem An individual agent’s optimisation problem is the
following:
V (k, e, z,Γ) = max
c∈R+, k′∈κ




πe′z′|e,zV (k′, e′, z′,Γ′)
 (2.8a)
subject to:
k(1 + r(K,L, z) − δ) + [(1 − τ)le+ µ(1 − e)]w(K,L, z) − c = k′ (2.8b)
Γ′ = G(Γ, z, z′) (2.8c)
k′ ≥ 0. (2.8d)
Where r(·) is the real interest rate and w(·) the wage rate, δ is the constant rate at
which capital depreciates, l is individual time endowment, µ unemployment insurance
as a percentage of the wage rate, τ is a tax on labour income and Γ the measure
of agents over wealth and employment status. Equation 2.8a is a standard Bellman
equation. Budget constraint (2.8b) states that the future individual capital stock is
composed of today’s capital, compounded by the depreciation-adjusted rental price of
capital, r(K,L, z)− δ, the labour income (1− τ)lw(K,L, z) when an agent is employed,
or µw(K,L, z) if an agent is unemployed, less today’s consumption. (2.8c) is the
forecasting rule for the future distribution of Γ and for the aggregate state variable.
Agents about the next period’s distribution because it determines future prices. Finally,
(2.8d) is the borrowing constraint: which restricts next period’s capital choice to be
positive.
Government The only role of government in the model is to tax labour income to
fund the payment of unemployment insurance, they run a balanced budget each period.
This means that:
w(K,L, z)τ lL︸ ︷︷ ︸
government income
= w(K,L, z)µ(1 − L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
government expenditure
which implies that the tax rate is:
τ = µ(1 − L)
lL
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where L is total employed labour, and (1 − L) the unemployment rate.
Firm’s Problem Factor prices follow from the competitive firm’s optimisation
problem, as in the standard representative agent model:
MPL = ∂Y
∂L
= (1 − α)z(K/L)α = w(K,L, z);
MPK = ∂Y
∂K
= αz(K/L)α−1 = r(K,L, z), where the last equalities hold due to competi-









where A = κ×E is the type space of agents over capital holdings and employment
status. The associated measurable space is M = (A,B(A)) where B(A) = B(κ) × P(E)
is the Borel σ-algebra of A and P(E) is the power set of E. The set of all measures on
M is M, and we shall require that Γ is an element of M.
2.3.1 Recursive Competitive Rational Expectations Equilibrium
The KS recursive competitive equilibrium can be defined in the following way:
Definition 1. Recursive competitive rational expectations equilibrium
A recursive competitive rational expectations equilibrium consists of:
(i) A value function: V ∗(k, e, z,Γ) : A × Z × M → R which solves the individual’s
optimisation problem (2.8a), with the associated optimal decision rule for capital:
gk′(k, e, z,Γ) : A× Z × M → R, gk′(k, e, z,Γ) = k′∗
(ii) Pricing functions:
w∗(K,L, z) : M × Z → R, w∗(K,L, z) = (1 − α)z(K/L)α
r∗(K,L, z) : M × Z → R, r∗(K,L, z) = αz(K/L)α−1
which solve the firm’s optimisation problem.
(iii) An equilibrium transition function:
G∗(Γ, z, z′) : Z × Z × M → M, G∗(Γ, z, z′) = Γ′
that is consistent with the law of motion for Γ implied by individual decision rule,
gk′(·), and the Markov process πe′,z′|e,z.
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2.3.2 Computational Strategy
The recursive competitive rational expectations equilibrium is not solvable analytically
due to the nature of the equilibrium function G∗, which is a doubly-infinite-dimensional
operator. KS use two approximating steps to reduce the state space. The first is
to make some restrictions on the Markov process so that the unemployment rate is
constant (but different) for each z. This has the effect of reducing the number of
state variables, and so we only need to keep track of agents’ holdings of capital, Γ̃.
However, the law of motion for capital holdings G̃ still maps an infinite dimensional
object to itself. So the second simplification is to propose using a finite sub-sample of
the moments of Γ̃ to forecast the entire future distribution.
The algorithm takes the form of an inner and outer loop.18 In the outer loop, we
specify the functional form and coefficients of a forecasting function which some subset
of information of the entire wealth distribution lj(Γ̃) where j is the number of statistics
of the distribution used. This information is updated using the forecasting function
Gj(lj, z). Given {Gj, lj} we solve the individual problem to get gk′(k, e, z;Gj, lj). We
then initialise a large sample of agents of dimension N with initial values of {k0i , e0i }Ni=1
from which we compute lj(Γ̃0). Using the Markov transition matrix and individual
policy gk′ we then update {k1i , e1i }Ni=1. The algorithm continues in this fashion until
some predetermined simulation end point T , when we run a set of linear regressions
and check for correspondence between the coefficients of Ĝj and Gj, call them b̂j and
bj, respectively. If the two are within some error ϵ of each other, we say that the
solution has been reached and the algorithm solves for prices, if not then we update the
regression coefficients of Gj as b̃j = λbj + (1 − λ)b̂j where λ is a smoothing parameter.
For example, if j = 1 then we may specify the functional form of the forecasting
function as GK,z = log(K ′) = ϕK,z;0 + ϕK,z,1 logK. Once the simulation is run, we
compare estimates ˆϕK,z;0 and ˆϕK,z;1 with ϕ′0,z and ϕ′1,z and iterate until the coefficients
of the forecasting equation at the individual level are consistent with the parameters
at the aggregate level.
So there is some mapping Φ from the perceived law of motion G to the actual law
of motion G∗ = Φ(G) and we want to find the fixed point G = Φ(G). The major
difficulty in using this algorithm is that Φ is not a contraction - so a good initial guess
is vital. The key finding of the Krusell and Smith (1999) paper was to show that
simply using the mean of the capital distribution is an adequate statistic for agents
18Here I present the intuition for the algorithm. See appendix B.1 for a more rigorous treatment.
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to use in order to forecast the entire distribution to a high degree of accuracy. This
finding is termed approximate aggregation, so a suitable initial guess is the steady state
solution to corresponding representative agent problem, a link which I will develop in
the following section.
2.4 Approximate Aggregation
2.4.1 Link with representative agent models
To see why approximate aggregation holds, consider the following simple example.
Without individual or aggregate uncertainty in the KS model, if agents had linear
saving policies, each individual i having the same intercept ϕ0 and constant marginal
propensity to save ϕ1, the individual policy function would take the form:
k′i = ϕ0 + ϕ1ki
Then aggregation is easy:
K ′ = ϕ0 + ϕ1K.
Because we are working with probability space and normalise total labour supply, L
to be one, the first moment is equal to total asset holding, K. We can exactly aggregate
all of the individual policy functions and the first moment of the wealth distribution is
a the only statistic we need to perfectly forecast capital stock tomorrow.
Approximate aggregation holds in the KS model because the vast majority of
agents act approximately in this manner, having near-linear savings functions and
constant marginal propensities to save. Only a few that are constrained have very
low zero marginal propensity to save out of income, but they are too small in number
to affect the aggregate result dramatically. Figure (2.8) plots the individual capital
policy functions for the baseline KS economy. Though functions exhibits non-linearity
for the poorest agents, there are very few agents in this region, and low amounts of
redistribution to this area.
Figure 2.9 shows the diagrammatic representation of competitive equilibrium in a
textbook representative agent model. Specifically, it is the steady state of the Ramsey
model (Ramsey, 1928), a model which features a single representative agent and no
aggregate uncertainty. The capital demand curve KD comes directly from the firms’
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Fig. 2.8 Individual Capital Policy Functions in the KS Model
This period’s individual capital (k) plotted against next period’s capital choice (k’) for
aggregate capital=39 and good aggregate state.
maximisation problem, and equals the marginal product of capital (MPK). The capital
supply curve KS is clearly defined by the representative agent’s maximisation problem,
capital is supplied inelastically such that the impatience of households exactly equals
the rewards of patience so that r = ρ. We can see from the diagram that the equilibrium
of this model eR exists at the intersection of the two curves; the equilibrium is unique
and stable. The intuition behind this result is that if the economy starts from a low
capital base, capital has a high marginal product. This induces the representative agent
to save more as a proportion of income. As a result aggregate saving is greater than
that which is required to replace the depreciating capital stock, therefore its intensity
increases. As this happens, a decreasing marginal product of capital induces saving to
decline until eventually it is just sufficient to maintain the capital intensity. A similar
argument can be made for an economy starting with a high level of capital. Because
the interest rate and rate of time preference are perfectly balanced, capital does not
grow over time: corresponding to an aggregate law of motion where ϕ0 = 0 and ϕ1 = 1.
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Fig. 2.9 Steady State in the Ramsey
Model
The capital demand curve KDcomes from the firm’s
maximisation problem, they equate the marginal product of
capital ∆f∆K with its marginal cost r. The capital supply
curve KS comes from the representative agent’s problem,
they equate the gain from saving r with their level of
impatience ρ.
Fig. 2.10 Steady State in the Aiyagari
Model
The capital demand curve KD is determined as in the
representative agent model. The capital supply curve KS is
given by expected long run average assets, with the
expectation taken with respect to the stationary
distribution of z. This figure assumes a borrowing
constraint, b equal to 0.
While the capital demand curve in the KS model is determined in exactly the same
way as in the representative agent model, the capital supply curve is not analogous,
indeed it is not well-defined at all. To see this consider a model which, conceptually, is
a step between the representative agent model just discussed and the KS model.
The Aiyagari (1994) model, like KS, features agents which become endogenously
heterogeneous. Furthermore, idiosyncratic uncertainty and a borrowing constraint also
generate a precautionary motive for saving. Unlike the KS model, Aiyagari abstracts
from aggregate uncertainty in order to focus on the steady state equilibrium where the
type distribution of agents, and therefore prices, is constant over time. This steady
state equilibrium is shown in figure 2.10. Capital demand is determined in the same
fashion as the Ramsey and KS models. The capital supply curve is more interesting
than the representative agent case, in that it is an increasing function of the interest
rate. This occurs because of the different histories of labour endowment shocks to
agents. Some agents are unlucky: their filtration involves more negative shocks than
others. They will want to use their savings to smooth consumption. However, they
do not wish to consume all of their savings as the poorer they get the closer they get
to the borrowing constraint, and so the greater the likelihood of violating their Euler
equation. This trade-off illustrates why the capital supply curve is upward sloping. It
also explains why the borrowing constraint generates a precautionary savings motive.
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Clearly, the equilibrium only exists for r < ρ since demand for assets goes off to infinity
for values close to, or exceeding ρ. This steady state is then determined where capital
demand is equal to capital supply, at a lower interest rate and with higher saving levels
than in the representative agent equilibrium.
The KS model is the Aiyagari model with aggregate shocks to the economy, where
the type distribution of agents changes over time. This can intuitively be thought of
as eA moving with the aggregate state in figure 2.10. This also illustrates why agents
must keep track of the distribution of capital, since this affects aggregate capital and
forecasts the interest rate r. The more nonlinear the individual capital policy functions,
and the greater the mass of individuals in the nonlinear part of the policy functions,
the greater the response in aggregate capital in response to aggregate shocks.
2.5 Benchmark KS model vs. Data
In this section, I take the KS model to the data and briefly reiterate the well-known
fact that, in its benchmark form, it cannot capture the degree of wealth inequality
seen in US PSID data. I then detail how the commonly used method of dispersion in
discount factors helps to fit the cross-sectional wealth distribution with much greater
accuracy. Finally, I show that this technique implies a contradiction when the model is
calibrated to the data over the Great Recession.
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 compare the wealth distributions generated by the KS
benchmark calibration for good and bad aggregate states with the empirical wealth
distributions in 2006 and 2008. Clearly, there are major shortcomings in matching the
distribution. In the cross section, the empirical distribution features a mass of families
around the zero wealth mark, a heavily right-skewed distribution and a significant
number of families with negative wealth. The KS distribution is also right-skewed, but
not nearly to the same extent, with a much smaller range of wealth values. Furthermore,
no agents have zero wealth or negative wealth. In terms of the dynamics, we see that
empirically many more families had zero or negative wealth in 2008 than in 2006,
whereas the KS distribution features a leftward shift of the distribution but again



































Fig. 2.11 Benchmark KS model wealth distribution (left) versus data (right), good
aggregate state
Benchmark calibration of the KS model in the good aggregate state (left) scaled to make aggregate






























Fig. 2.12 Benchmark KS model wealth distribution (left) versus data (right), bad
aggregate state
Benchmark calibration of the KS model in the bad aggregate state (left) scaled to make aggregate
capital K equal to the mean of the empirical wealth distribution in 2008 (right).
2.6 Changing the Parameters of the KS Model
Table 2.2 shows the effects on aggregate capital of experimenting with key parameters
of the model. The full list of parameters in the baseline KS model is reported in table
2.1. I report aggregate capital as this summarises the combined effect of more mass
in the nonlinear region of the policy rule (agents face more bad luck) and a more
nonlinear policy function (the precautionary savings motive is higher).
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Table 2.1 KS Baseline Parameters
Parameter Description Value
α Elasticity of Output w.r.t. Capital 0.36
β Discount Rate 0.99
δ Depreciation Rate 0.025
σ Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution 1†
ϕ Borrowing Constraint 0
µ Unemployment Insurance (Replacement Rate) 0.15
l̄ Individual Time Endowment 1
δz Size of the Aggregate Shock 0.01
ψ Recession multiplier‡ 1.25
Aggregate State
zg zb
Unemployment duration 1.5Q∗ 2.5 Q
Unemployment rate 0.04 0.1
Duration of aggregate state 8 Q 8 Q
Markov Transition Matrix
e, z\e′z′ {e′g, z′g} {e′g, z′b} {e′b, z′g} {e′b, z′b}
{eg, zg} 0.850694 0.583333 0.122917 0.09375
{eg, zb} 0.024306 0.291667 0.002083 0.046
{eb, zg} 0.115885 0.03125 0.836111 0.096
{eb, zb} 0.009115 0.563 0.023 0.525
Notes:
† Implies logarithmic utility.
‡ The probability of remaining unemployed when economy transitions from z = zg
to z′ = zb is ψ times the probability of remaining unemployed when economy transi-
tions from z = zb to z′ = zb.
∗ Quarters.
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Table 2.2 Experiment Model Parameters
KS Values Experimental Values
Parameter Description Value K̄bad K̄good Value K̄bad K̄good
δz Size of the
aggregate shock 0.01 39.07 39.65 0.2 38.73 40.07
µ Unemployment insurance
(replacement rate) 0.15 " " 0 39.16 39.73
σ Risk aversion 1† " " 0.4 39.01 39.55
β Discount factor 0.99 " " 0.98 39.15 39.65
Notes: † Implies logarithmic utility. Aggregate capital K in the good and bad aggregate state for the
KS model benchmark parameters and experimental values listed.
Changing the size of δz determines the size of the productivity shocks to the
aggregate economy. This primarily affects the division of output rather than the total
amount of output, as in an expansion (recession) there is more (less) income to be
distributed to the factors of production. Looking at table 2.2 reveals that even pushing
δz up to 0.2, i.e., 20% of output lost in a recession - 4 times greater than the Great
Recession - only serves to push aggregate savings in the bad aggregate state down
slightly, and up slightly in the good aggregate state. It doesn’t greatly affect the cross
sectional inequality or dynamics of the wealth distribution due to the infinite horizon
nature of the model: the effective time period is so long that the ability to self-insure
against shocks is very high.
Table 2.2 also details some of the results of lowering σ. This has the effect of
making agents less risk averse, inducing agents to save less, and induces slightly greater
non-linearities in the capital policy by making it more likely that they are close to the
borrowing constraint. Overall, reducing σ significantly has a very minimal effect on
the wealth distribution, individual capital policy functions, and aggregate capital.
The idea behind changing µ, the replacement rate, to zero is to not offer agents a
safety net when unemployed: this should increase idiosyncratic risk, and increase the
number of ‘hand-to-mouth’ consumers. Here my results are consistent with Krueger
et al. (2016): very little about the aggregate dynamics, individual policy functions and
wealth distribution changes even when we dispose of this safety net entirely.
Chapter 2
The final experiment in table 2.2 lowers β from a value of 0.99 to 0.98. From these
results it is clear to see why modifying the discount factor has been a popular modelling
choice: lowering this rate by only 0.01 increases aggregate capital in the bad aggregate
state by as much as removing unemployment benefits entirely. In the following section
I show the results of extending this simple experiment to have a distribution of βs in
order to capture the empirical wealth distribution.
2.7 Improving the distributional fit (β-Dist)
Improving the fit to the wealth distribution goes back to Krusell and Smith (1998) in
which they added the assumption of a stochastic discount factor, β̃, which can take
values {0.9858, 0.9894, 0.9930}. β̃ follows a three-state Markov chain which generates
an invariant distribution for discount factors that is symmetric around its mean. KS
gave the intuition that this was a way of modelling overlapping generations with
different levels of patience - it in fact creates three types of agents (impatient, baseline,
patient). I use the specification from Castañeda et al. (2003) because it is much quicker
to solve, and so is more often used in the literature. The major difference between
this and the stochastic discount factor model is that agents’ discount parameters do
not change over time, as such the model generates much less mobility in the wealth
distribution. Specifically, they choose time preference parameters to be distributed
uniformly in the population between β̀ ± ∇ to fit the proportion of wealth w held by







Using a distribution of discount factors helps to better fit the skewness of the
empirical distribution as it attenuates the precautionary saving motive for agents with
lower discount factors to generate a larger mass at the bottom end of the distribution.
In a sense, they become myopic to likelihood of hitting the borrowing constraint. It also
fits the upper parts of the distribution by heightening the desire to save for agents with
higher discount factors. It is not only a useful device for better fitting the empirical
distribution, but also backed by empirical evidence of heterogeneity in discount factors.
In a study of military drawdown payments, Warner and Pleeter (2001) find discount
factors between 0.76 and 1.0 when military personnel were given the choice between
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a lump-sum payment or annuity. In order to best fit the minimisation problem of
equation 2.11, I find that a much smaller variation in β̀ of ∇ = 0.01 is sufficient to fit
the empirical distribution. This much smaller variance is likely due to coarse fitting
points, in accordance with the literature I use only 4 datapoints and do not fit the
maximum or minimum (0 % or 100 %) quantiles.19 Furthermore, Warner and Pleeter
(2001) find that individual discount factors depend on the amount of money under
consideration. Their study deals with large lump-sum or annuity payments, whereas
the individuals in this study face ongoing savings considerations of variable amounts.
Fig. 2.13 Distribution of Wealth (Lorenz Curves)
Wealth distributions for Krussell-Smith (KS-JEDC) vs. β distribution, calibrated to 2006
(left) and 2008 (right) PSID data.
Figure 2.13 shows Lorenz Curves generated from solving for the β̀s and ∇s which
solve equation 2.11 for PSID waves 2007 (capturing 2006 data, i.e., pre-recession) and
2009 (2008 recession data). The dashed line labelled KS-JEDC is the benchmark KS
model. The solid line labelled β-Dist is the KS model with the addition of heterogeneous
discount factors.Clearly, a relatively small variation in discount factors can dramatically
improve the fit to the empirical wealth distribution. The baseline KS model exhibits
very little wealth inequality while the β-Dist models capture the pre-recession and
recession data closely. Table 2.3 shows how this addition to the model accomplishes
this: by creating much greater variation in the marginal propensity to consume over
the cross section. In the 2007 calibration, the poorest agents20 consume over 30% of
a shock to income, this figure decreases as income levels increase, with the richest
consuming 15%. High MPCs are concentrated in unemployed agents, who consume
19To fit the distribution more closely is a small modification to the algorithm. The contradiction in
business cycle dynamics still exists in this case.
20I report the MPCs for annual income quintile, a very similar pattern of dispersion exists when
looking in terms of wealth quintiles.
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nearly 60% of an income shock in the 2007 calibration, compared to just over 20% for
employed agents. In the 2009 calibration, the dispersion in marginal propensity to
consume is much greater. The poorest agents consume over 50% of a shock to income,
with the richest increasing their share to 25%. Both employed and unemployed agents
increase their MPC compared to the 2007 calibration by around 10 percentage points,















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.8 Contradictions in the β-Dist model
2.8.1 Dynamics of the MPC
Table 2.3 also shows a contradiction of the model including heterogeneous discount
factors. When looking the dispersion of the MPC across the distribution’s internal
business cycle dynamics (comparing columns ‘Recession’ and ‘Expansion’ within a
calibration), it is clear to see that in both the 2007 and 2009 calibrations, the MPCs vary
very little over the cycle. In the 2007 calibration, the aggregate marginal propensity to
consume increases from 0.25 to 0.27 in a recession, and falls to 0.24 in an expansion.
Similarly, the 2009 calibration increases from an MPC of 0.35 to 0.37 in a recession and
falls to 0.33 in an expansion. However, the implied difference in MPC given the wealth
distributions accross the calibrations are 10 percentage points higher in the recession
sample than the pre-recession sample. To make this point more clearly, figure 2.14 plots
these MPC values within calibrations (top two figures) and across calibrations (bottom
figure). While a recession increases the MPC for the very poorest quintile significantly,
the rest of the distribution barely changes. In contrast, to fit the wealth distributions
across the calibrations requires a shift in the MPCs, and therefore individual policy
functions, for the whole of the distribution. The within-calibration MPC changes are
consistent with a greater mass of agents becoming closer to the borrowing constraint.
The across-calibration MPCs suggests that preferences across the distribution have
fundamentally changed, or something else has occurred in the Great Recession to shift
individual policy functions that the model is not capturing.21
21Note that these results are obtained without making any special assumptions about the nature of
the Great Recession in terms of its severity or duration. Krueger et al. (2016) explores calibrating
the KS model aggregate shocks to the frequency of observed severe recessions - defined as historical
periods where unemployment exceeded 9% for at least one quarter and remains above 7% thereafter.

























































Year ● ●2007 2009
Fig. 2.14 KS β-Dist Simulated MPC at the Income Quintiles
MPC at the income quintiles generated from 2006 calibration pre-recession (top left) and
2008 calibration in expansion (top right). Compared with baseline 2006 and baseline 2008
calibrations (bottom left). Annual MPC is calculated by 1−(1−quarterly MPC)4. Calculated
for the β-Dist models calibrated to the net worth distribution for a given year. The results
are obtained by running the simulation over 1,000 periods. Recession/Expansion MPCs are
defined as averaging over bad/good realizations of the aggregate state. Baseline MPCs are
defined as averaging over all realizations of the aggregate state.
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2.8.2 Borrowing constraint
I consider a second modification to the benchmark KS model which implies a contradic-
tion when compared to PSID data. This modification to the benchmark model is the
lowering of the borrowing constraint. To my knowledge, no other paper has considered
this modification - probably because it is trivial - in terms of the solution it simply
shifts the distribution by a constant and has no effects on the dynamics.22 However,
I consider it firstly because a significant proportion of individuals in the PSID hold
zero or negative net wealth: 12.7% in 2006, 16.1% in 2008. Secondly, I will show that
changing the borrowing constraint implies a contradiction with empirical evidence that
finds that credit constraints are higher in recessions than in normal economic times.23
To fit the evidence of significant holdings of zero or negative wealth, I add an outer
loop to the algorithm which solves the model, which uses the 2006 β-Dist calibration
and lowers the budget constraint by 0.1 until the gap between the model-generated
percentage of agents holding negative wealth is within ϵ = 0.01 of the 2006 empirical
figure. Because the algorithm fits the percentage of people with negative wealth, rather
than the cumulative wealth held, it doesn’t do a great job of improving the fit of the
empirical Lorenz Curves - compare figures 2.15, the empirical Lorenz curve estimated
from the PSID and the KS β-Dist model generated 2.16. In the data, both the fraction
of individuals holding negative wealth and the amounts of negative wealth increase
substantially in the recession relative to the pre-recession estimation. Figure 2.16 shows
the Lorenz curve in the good and bad aggregate state within the 2007 calibration;
neither the fraction of agents holding negative wealth nor the amounts of negative
wealth held change significantly in the dynamics over the cycle (which should not be
surprising, given that this modification does not change the dynamics of the β-Dist
model).
22Not to mention, it takes a long time to solve - one iteration of the Carroll et al. (2017) Mathematica
code takes around 8 hours on my MacBook Pro 2013 laptop with 2.6 GHz processor and 8 GB RAM;
I rewrote the algorithm based on Maliar et al. (2010) (see Appendix section B.2.1) code in Matlab
R2016b to get a total running time of 24 hours for all iterations of the borrowing constraint.
23Chapter 3 provides an overview of this evidence.
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Fig. 2.15 Empirical distribution of Wealth (Lorenz Curves)
Lorenz curves estimated from the PSID 2007 (left) and 2009 (right). Red bands are survey-
weighted confidence intervals.
Fig. 2.16 KS β-Dist Simulated Lorenz Curves
Lorenz curves generated from 2006 calibration with BC=-3.3 in good aggregate state (left)
and bad aggregate state (right).
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What is surprising is the implications for the borrowing constraint over the cycle. I
find that the borrowing constraint that fits the percentage of negative wealth holdings
in 2006 is -3.3. Figure 2.17 plots the percentage of the population holding negative
wealth for the β-Dist model solved with progressively looser borrowing constraints,
lowered by 0.1 on each iteration. The relationship between the fraction holding negative
wealth and the borrowing constraint is positive and convex. This implies that, in order
to better fit the greater mass of agents holding zero or negative wealth in the 2008
recession, it implies that the borrowing constraint has to be looser, i.e. that agents can


















































Fig. 2.17 Percent holding negative wealth by iteration through borrowing constraints
KS β-Dist model iterated through negative borrowing constraints. Each iteration is the
solution to the model which, starting at zero, lowers the borrowing constraint by 0.1.
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2.9 Conclusion
This chapter has presented the canonical heterogeneous agents model of Krusell
and Smith (1999), comparing its predictions to a representative agent model and
other related Bewley models. I presented the mechanics of the model under different
parameterisations. I then showed that a commonly used mechanism for fitting the
empirical wealth distribution implies contradictory results when we look more closely
at the dynamics over the cycle. In order to fit the empirical wealth distribution at
two points in time, before and during the Great Recession, MPCs and the implied
individual policy functions for consumption must shift. However, the internal dynamics
of the model imply an increase in the MPC for only the poorest agents, consistent
with a greater mass of agents near the borrowing constraint. This implies that either
preferences changed over the great recession, or something else changed that is not
currently captured within the model. I also showed that fitting the fraction of consumers
with zero or negative wealth in the KS model with heterogeneous βs implies that the
budget constraint must be looser in a recession compared with non-recessionary times,
contrary to standard models of financial frictions and empirical evidence on credit
availability over the business cycle. In the next chapter, I will look at the possible
explanations for what changed over the Great Recession in order to reconcile the




The Great Recession had a large-reaching influences on consumption, saving and the
wealth distribution in the US. Bricker et al. (2012) find that over the period 2007 -
2010, median net worth fell 38.8 percent in real terms, and the Survey of Consumer
Finances also documents that net worth decreased considerably relative to income; the
median net worth-to-income ratio declined from 8.5 in 2007 to 5.6 in 2010. De Nardi
et al. (2011) detail that it took almost 12 quarters for total real personal consumption
expenditures to return to the previous peak in 2007 Q4. Seen through the lens of the
incomplete market heterogeneous agent model discussed in chapter 2, this empirical
evidence suggests that the fraction of wealth-poor, high-marginal propensity to con-
sume (MPC) households rose substantially during this time. Other things equal, we
should expect there to have been an increase in the aggregate MPC. Such a finding
would be in line with the recent estimates of Heathcote and Perri (2018), who find that
consumers with low wealth cut their expenditures more sharply than those with high
wealth levels during the Great Recession. However, it is also possible that the function
itself shifted over the period, given that many of its determinants were also affected by
the recession.
Concretely, from previous literature the determinants that could plausibly generate
an increase in aggregate MPC over the recession are: 1) the interaction between the
model’s concave consumption function and a fall in wealth across the distribution 2)
an increase in the variance of income shocks, 3) borrowing constraints becoming tighter
during recessions. For point 1), as was discussed in chapter 2 in the standard incom-
plete market model of heterogeneous agents, wealth stocks act as a buffer to smooth
consumption against income shocks. This is because there are no Arrow securities;
holding capital stocks is the only form of insurance available. Households very close to
the borrowing constraint have a precautionary motive to save more, and consume less,
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in order to avoid hitting the borrowing constraint and potentially violating their Euler
equation. A general fall in wealth stocks implies more households in the high-MPC
area of the consumption function and therefore an increase in aggregate MPC.
Point 2) is described extensively in Carroll et al. (2014) in a calibrated incomplete
markets heterogeneous agents model. They consider two types of income shocks:
permanent (highly persistent shocks) and transitory ones. Decomposing income into
these two components is a standard way of thinking about income shocks in the
literature, and goes back to Friedman (1957). Carroll et al. (2014) show that increases
in the variance of permanent shocks do not have a significant effect on the consumption
function - this stands to reason, since recessions are temporary, there is little correlation
between permanent shocks and aggregate uncertainty. However, an increase in the
variance in transitory shock affects the consumption function significantly, by shifting
it upwards and also manifesting as a larger aggregate MPC. There is certainly a large
literature on the deleterious effects of recessions on labour markets, see for example
Elsby et al. (2010) on the Great Recession. Moreover, Guvenen et al. (2014) find that
the left-skewness of income shocks is countercyclical.
For point 3), there is ample evidence that borrowing constraints are tighter during
periods of falling economic activity. Particularly in financial crises, the sharp drop in
lending can worsen and prolong economic downturns (Bernanke and Gertler (1989);
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). Ludvigson (1999) finds that predictable growth in con-
sumer credit is significantly related to consumption growth in the macroeconomic
time series. Gross (1994) estimate using bankruptcy data that MPC out of liquid
funds is 20-30% higher during the Great Recession. However, as I detail in chapter
2, in order to fit the proportion of households with negative wealth, the standard
incomplete markets model actually implies a decrease (ie loosening) of the borrowing
constraint over the Great Recession. While this mechanism certainly deserves to
be explored, because the current study is concerned with reconciling the incomplete
market heterogeneous agent model with empirical evidence, I leave it to future research.
The focus of this chapter is to distinguish between points 1) and 2). I do this
by estimating the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income over the
cross-section of income and the business cycle while controlling for point 3), borrowing
constraint changes. If the variance in transitory income (point 2) is the mechanism
through which aggregate MPC increases, we should expect to see a shift in the con-
Chapter 3
sumption function and a steepening towards the origin. Meanwhile if point 1), a fall in
wealth interacting with concave consumption function, is occurring we should not find
a shift in the consumption function over the whole distribution in a recession. Usually
studies estimate the marginal propensity to consume for the whole distribution, and do
not allow the possibility for it to vary with economic conditions. My first contribution
is to estimate the consumption response response to transitory income shock by income
quintile over the business cycle. Secondly, by comparing estimates of the pre-recession
and recession consumption function I am able to determine whether the increase in
aggregate MPC is more likely due to a shift in the consumption function or a greater
mass of individuals in the high-MPC area.
The paper is organised as follows: section 3.2 reviews the related literature, 3.4
describes the data. Section 3.5 describes the empirical estimation strategy and 3.6.
Section 3.7 concludes with some suggested avenues for future research.
3.2 Related Literature
There are two major difficulties with getting empirical estimates of the consumption and
savings responses to income shocks across the population. The first is data availability:
ideally the researcher would have good panel data on income and consumption expen-
ditures. Having a large sample across a number of time period is key to well-estimated
results due to the widely-documented measurement error inherent in consumption data.
Unfortunately, in the US, this data does not exist within a single dataset over a long
time horizon. There are a number of panel data sets, but none contain comprehensive
data on both variables over time. The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID)
has extremely accurate data on income (Lusardi (1996)) but the questions it asks
on consumption are limited to food and housing expenditure before 1999, and only
include good consumption data biennially since 2005. In contrast, the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics has excellent data on
consumption, whereas income data is limited. Previous authors have circumvented
this problem either by using the limited data in one of the two datasets (e.g., Hall
and Mishkin (1982)), or by creating a synthetic panel (Attanasio and Davis (1996)).
More recently, Blundell et al. (2008) used food demand estimates to impute a measure
of non-durable consumption for the PSID from CEX data. I am able to estimate
consumption responses to income shocks by utilising a method which requires only 3
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consecutive time periods on recently available PSID data.
The second difficulty is in identifying individual income shocks; specifically, difficulty
lies in determining the transitory and permanent components. In survey data we only
observe total income, so previous approaches have included just working with the
change in this variable, for example Krueger and Perri (2005). Other studies have
used proxies for transitory income changes, such as unemployment or illness. Another
large strand of the literature estimates the consumption response of households to
tax rebates (e.g. Kaplan and Violante (2014), Souleles (2002), Johnson et al. (2004)).
In both cases, it is unclear the extent to which such events are truly unanticipated.
Furthermore, in the latter approach it is unclear what the interaction of expected
government spending changes might be. The current paper employs a two stage
estimation technique in order to extract the response to transitory income shocks.
First, I regress the log of consumption, and the log of income on explanatory variables
which capture the predictable parts of consumption and income due to individual
heterogeneity, leaving only transitory and permanent shocks in the error term. I then
use covariance restrictions to identify a consistent estimator of the covariance between
transitory shocks in consumption and income. This method is developed in Blundell
et al. (2008), and described in full detail in section 3.5 below.
There are a large number of studies which estimate the MPC over the whole
population. Different approaches on distinct datasets, timespans, economic conditions,
and on different components of consumption estimate aggregate annual MPC in a large
band of between 0.-0.8. For example, Blundell et al. (2008) estimate non-durable MPC
to be 0.05, Parker et al. (2013) estimate it in the region of 0.5-0.9 for total personal
consumtpion expenditures, Souleles (2002) estimate non-durable MPC in the range
0.6-0.9; Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) and Carroll et al. (2017) provide an excellent
survey. Research that looks at heterogeneity of MPC across the population includes
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2014) who use Italian Survey data which specifically asks
respondents how much they would consume out of a transitory income shock. They
find on average across the population a value of 0.48, with low cash-on-hand individuals
exhibiting a much higher value than high cash-on-hand types. Another study which
looks at MPC over portions of the distribution is Kaplan et al. (2014), whose paper also
uses the method outlined in Blundell et al. (2008) to estimate marginal propensities
for subsets termed ‘wealthy hand-to-mouth’ (W-HtM), ‘poor hand-to-mouth’ (P-HtM)
and ‘not hand-to-mouth’ (N-HtM) . Those labelled ‘hand-to-mouth’ are distinguished
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as those holding very little wealth in liquid asset classes, and are ‘Wealthy’ if they
also hold sizeable amounts of illiquid assets, and ‘Poor’ if they do not. They find that
both HtM types have dramatically higher MPCs ( 0.44) than N-HtM ( 0.10) types. I
utilise their two measures of poor and wealthy hand-to-mouth individuals to control
for changing borrowing constraints over the Great Recession, described in section 3.4.3,
below.
The contribution of this chapter is looking at MPC over the business cycle, for
which the literature is sparse. Gross et al. (2016) is - to my knowledge - unique in
estimating the variation of MPC over the business cycle. Using bankruptcy data they
estimate MPC out of liquid funds to be around 0.37 in good times, and 20-30% higher
during the Great Recession, suggesting a large role for tightened liquidity constraints
during bad economic times in driving this variation. However, their study is based
on US consumers that have previously filed for bankruptcy which limits the extent
to which the results can be generalised to the population as a whole. It also differs
from the current study in that the shock to income (the lifting of bankruptcy flags) is
predictable, whereas I assume that future shocks are fully unanticipated. Finally, this
paper uses survey-weighted data to provide estimates applicable for the full population.
3.3 The Average Propensity to Consume and Save
The left hand side of figure 3.18 shows an estimate of the average propensity to consume,
calculated from the PSID by dividing average consumption by the average level of
income for the pre-recession period (2002-2006) and recession period (2008-2012) by
the average level of income over the same time horizons. In this estimation, the identity
of households is fixed by quintile at the beginning of the period, ie. the 2002 - 2006
average consumption for the bottom quintile is for households in the bottom quintile
in 2002 (regardless of quintile in the following years). This estimate suggests that
low-income households consume a much greater fraction of their income compared to
their high-income counterparts on average. It also provides suggestive evidence that
the consumption function may not have not change markedly over the recession except
for a slight steepening at the bottom quintile. However, it is important to note that
this is an estimate of the average, rather than the marginal propensity to consume,
and it does not does not control for household characteristics, borrowing constraints,
or distinguish between the components of income or consumption shocks.
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The right hand side of 3.18 shows the change in total net wealth calculated from
PSID data by dividing the change in net wealth over the time periods by average income,
plotted for the income quintiles. Clearly, there is a stark difference in pre-recession and
recession periods. In the pre-recession period the change in total wealth is much greater
for higher income individuals, and the difference in the pre-recession and recession
periods is stark. During 2002-2006, total net wealth change was much greater than
in the 08-12 period across the distribution. Falls in wealth were experienced by the
poorest quintile in the recession period, and the rest of the distribution saw very small
increases. Occasionally the change in wealth is taken to be an estimate of the average
savings rate24, which would suggest a difficulty in reconciling the left and right graphs
since MPC=1-MPS and we see a shift in ‘saving’ but not consumption. However, it
is important to note that the change in net wealth also contains capital gains and
























































year ● ●02−06 08−12
Fig. 3.18 Empirical Distributions of Average Consumption and Average Wealth Change
by Year and Income Quintile
Average consumption rates divided by average income by income quintile (left); average net total
wealth change divided by average income by income quintile, (right). Pre-recession period: 2002-2006,
recession: 2008-2012. Calculated by the author from survey-weighted PSID data.
24See, for example, Dynan et al. (2004).
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3.4 Data
In the first stage regressions, detailed in section 3.5, I estimate the predictable elements
of consumption and income changes in order to leave only permanent and transitory
shocks in the residual for the second stage regressions which recover the MPC. For this
first stage, I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics public use dataset,
a nationally representative longitudinal survey of US households which is completed
biennially. I combine it with PSID wealth supplements which provides detailed data
on wealth and assets. For the pre- and recession periods (2002-2006 and 2008-2012) I
joined each adjacent year by finding those households that had the same household
head. In other words, in order to increase the sample size, I only require the households
to be the same within the periods, but they can differ across the periods. The appendix
repeats the analysis with a smaller, balanced panel over 2002-2012 and finds very
similar results. The additional criteria for inclusion in the sample include having a
household head between the 22-65 and non-blank data not only for consumption and
income, but also all demographic and other control variables. In this section, I detail
the properties of the dependent and independent variables for the first state regression.
It is important to note that the PSID is known to undersample the most wealthy 1-2%
(Pfeffer et al. (2016)), so I use the weights and strata information provided. The design
of the PSID is a complex survey, therefore working with unweighted PSID data would
violate the assumption that observations are i.i.d., since the complex survey design
creates data with correlations between observations and unequal sampling probabilities.
It is also a top-coded survey for purposes of anonymity, I drop these observations since
the true values are unknown. This is innocuous since the very top of the income and
wealth distributions have so little mass, they do not matter for aggregate MPC.
3.4.1 Consumption data in the PSID
Since its release, consumption data in the PSID is starting to become much more
widely used in research, notably Blundell et al. (2016). However its introduction has
been gradual, with extra expenditure categories added over time. Figure 3.19 shows
the amounts calculated including food, transport, childcare, healthcare, education
and housing (consumption). In the 2004 survey, vacations, recreations and clothing
were added to the survey (consumption plus). There is some difference in the con-
sumption amounts including and excluding the extra categories, both in levels and in
co-movement with the cycle. Unfortunately, because the method of estimating marginal
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propensities requires a minimum of three time periods (see section 3.5 below), I use
consumption rather than consumption plus in the estimations. I drop observations
with negative or zero consumption values, around 0.01% of the sample per year.25
Table 3.4 compares the mean values of consumption and consumption plus to the
corresponding values reported from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Clearly,
the PSID means are smaller relative to the CEX means, even when including the
additional expenditure categories. It is likely that, even with extra consumption cate-
gories, because the PSID coverage is not as extensive as the CEX, it is underestimating
consumption. It is also possible that the mean values are lower because the PSID is
know to undersample the richest households. However, the dynamics of consumption
over the Great Recession are very similar in both the CEX and the PSID.
Table 3.4 Mean Consumption Comparison
Year c̄CEXi,t c̄i,t c̄PLUSi,t
2002 40677 28573 NA
2004 43395 35612 39559
2006 48400 38870 43112
2008 50486 37816 41837
2010 48109 37890 41502
2012 51442 38213 41878
c̄CEX is mean consumption available from the CEX
c̄t is the corresponding estimate in the PSID data
c̄PLUSt is mean PSID consumption plus extra expen-
diture categories, author’s calculations.
25Negative consumption values come from imputed consumption values from the PSID, which uses
a linear regression to predict missing consumption values.
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Fig. 3.19 Mean Consumption in the PSID
Consumption = food + transport + childcare + healthcare + education + housing; Consumption
Plus = consumption + vacations + recreation + clothing
3.4.2 Measuring After-Tax Income
The PSID reports total taxable income of the household in the preceding year to
the survey, ie., yit + Tt where T is a lump sum tax. However, for the purposes of
understanding consumption and saving responses to income changes, I calculate after-
tax income. It is important to use after-tax income because changes in taxation could
change consumption responses. To do this, I use the TAXSIM program from NBER,
which estimates the tax lump-sum given details of income, family composition and
deductions. I use the method outlined in Butrica and Burkhauser (1997) by adapting
code from Kimberlin et al. (2014) to include 2013 data. Clearly, it is very important
that after-tax income is well measured, so table 3.5 compares average (mean) after-tax
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income estimated from the CEX versus the corresponding quantity estimated from the
PSID using TAXSIM.








ȳCEX is mean after-tax income available
from the CEX
ȳt is the corresponding estimate in the
PSID data using TAXSIM from the
NBER, author’s calculations
The PSID values, although larger, are closer to CEX estimates in this case, likely
because the PSID covers more income categories, though it could also be due to an
underestimate of taxes in the TAXSIM programme. However, the dynamics over the
sample are again similar in both surveys.
3.4.3 Explanatory variables for Predictable Consumption/Income
Demographic and Economic variables
Demographic controls are all taken to be the values of the household head (which
in the PSID are overwhelmingly male). Controls include a dummy for year of birth,
dummies for education which takes three levels: up to high school education (low),
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college educated (medium), or some postgraduate (high). I control for employment
status which can take values employed, unemployed, retired or inactive. Also included
are race dummies (taking values white, black, and other), and variables for family size
and number of kids in the family unit. I include dummies for whether the family has
extra income coming from those outside the household, extra dependents outside the
family unit and categorical dummies for region: North East, Midwest, South, West.
Finally, I include controls for total net wealth level in thousands of dollars.
Controls for the borrowing constraint
Following Kaplan and Violante (2014) I distinguish two types of household: poor
hand-to-mouth (P-HtM) and wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM) which, due to a lack
of liquid assets on hand, can come up against binding borrowing constraints. Poor
hand-to-mouth households are defined as being at the credit limit when their illiquid
wealth holdings and liquid wealth holdings are not positive, and their cash-on-hand
and available credit is less than half their yearly income; i.e.:
ait ≤ 0, mit ≤ 0 and mit ≤ yit/2 −mit
where ait is holdings of illiquid wealth by household i in period t, mit is average balances
of liquid wealth over period t, yit is total household income and mit is the household’s
credit limit.
Wealthy hand-to-mouth households are defined similarly, with the key difference
being that they own positive illiquid assets, i.e.:
ait ≥ 0, mit ≤ 0 and mit ≤ yit/2 −mit
In the PSID, illiquid wealth is calculated as the sum of home equity, other real estate
equity, private annuities and other assets. Liquid wealth is the sum of checking and
saving accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposits, savings bonds, treasury
bills, stocks net of liquid debt which includes all debt other than mortgage debt. Figures
3.20 and 3.21 show the fraction of Poor HtM and Wealthy HtM households in the PSID,
the fractions are consistent with those reported by Kaplan and Violante (2014). The
fraction of wealthy hand-to-mouth households falls over the Great Recession while the
fraction of poor rises. Interestingly, calculated for the quintiles of income, the fraction
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of P-HtM exhibits a strong negative relationship, while the fraction of W-HtM is an
inverted U-shape in each year. The fractions within a given quintile for the wealthy
hand-to-mouth are relatively stable over the Great Recession, while the fraction of
P-HtM in the poorest income quintiles rises markedly. This is suggestive evidence that
borrowing constraints became more likely to bind for the very poorest hand-to-mouth
households during the recession, with less of a noticeable effect for the wealthy hand-to-
mouth. To control for binding borrowing constraints in the consumption and income
regressions, I use a dummy variable for Poor and Wealthy HtM households, equal to 1












Wealthy HtM Poor HtM
Fig. 3.20 Hand-to-mouth households in the PSID
Fraction of Poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM) and Wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM) consumers in the
PSID by year, author’s calculations
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Wealthy HtM Poor HtM
Fig. 3.21 Hand-to-mouth households by income quintile in the PSID
Fraction of Poor hand-to-mouth (P-HtM) and Wealthy hand-to-mouth (W-HtM) consumers in the
PSID by year and quintile, author’s calculations.
3.5 Econometric Model & Identifying Assumptions
3.5.1 Estimating the Marginal Propensity to Consume and Save
Following Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan et al. (2014), assume income follows the
process:
log Yi,t = Z′itΦt + Pi,t + ϵi,t (3.12)
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where i is an individual at time t, Y is income, Z is a set of observable income
characteristics, Pi,t = Pi,t−1 + ξi,t is a martingale permanent income process with i.i.d.
shock ξ; and ϵ is an i.i.d. transitory income shock. Blundell et al. (2008) show that such
a specification provides a good approximation to the solution of a life cycle optimization
problem where agents have CRRA utility.
By estimating equation 3.12 and recovering the first-differenced residuals, I obtain
unexplained income growth:
∆ŷi,t = ξi,t + ∆ϵi,t
where ŷi,t = log Yi,t − Z′itΦ̂t.
Consumption is assumed to be subject to the same processes but with loading
factors (marginal propensities) on permanent and transitory income shocks ψPi,t and
ψTi,t, giving unexplained growth as:
∆ĉi,t = ψPi,tξi,t + ψTi,t∆ϵi,t
where ∆ĉi,t is estimated first-differenced consumption residuals ĉi,t = log Yi,t−Z′itΨ̂t.
The covariance restriction necessary for identification of the marginal propensity to
save from transitory income shocks are that individuals have no foresight about future
shocks, i.e. cov(∆ci,t, ϵi,t+1) = cov(∆ci,t, ξi,t+1) = 0.




Which, using the covariance restrictions, can be estimated consistently via an





By using this methodology on a panel simulated from an incomplete insurance
model in which they can compare estimated and true values, Kaplan and Violante
(2010) show that this method works extremely well for estimating transitory shocks and
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is not biased in the presence of binding borrowing constraints. The estimation requires
3 periods of data for consumption: t− 1, t, t+ 1 so I drop households with fewer than
3 consecutive years of observations in each of the two time periods. To get an estimate
of the marginal propensity to consume across the distribution, I estimate equation
3.13 for the income quintiles at the beginning of the pre-recession and recession sample
period (2002 and 2008).
3.6 Results
In this section I begin with a summary of the first-stage regression output, the result
of estimating the income process in equation 3.12 and the corresponding consumption
equation. I then discuss the second-stage regression results which use the residuals
from the first-stage estimation to estimate the marginal propensity to consume. I
first discuss the results over the entire distribution for the pre-recession and recession
periods and then show the estimates over the income quintiles.
Table 3.6 details the results of the first-stage regressions to extract the predictable
parts of consumption and income. Though a means to estimating the marginal
propensity to consume, these results merit inspection in their own right. Year dummies
show time growth in consumption and income which is greater prior to the Great
Recession. As we might expect, income levels are greater by approximately 6 and 17
percent for the medium and high educated, respectively, relative to the low educated.
This greater income level does not transfer fully into consumption, which are greater
by approximately 3 and 10 percent for the same groups. Being a race other than white
is associated with lower income and consumption levels, while family size increases
both. More kids in the household is associated with lower consumption and income
levels, as is being unemployed, retired or inactive. Comparing the pre-recession and
recession periods by employment status, the penalty to consumption and income
increases for all non-employment in the recession period. Being in a region that is not
the North East is associated with a consumption and income penalty of between 2
and 5 percent, but this does not seem to change dramatically with the business cycle.
Both Poor Hand-To-Mouth households (those with cash on hand and available credit
at less than half their yearly income and a negative illiquid net worth position), and
Wealthy Hand-To-Mouth households (those with cash on hand and available credit
at less than half their yearly income but a positive illiquid net worth position) see a
penalty to consumption and income. Those that are P-HtM have lower consumption
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levels of approximately 8 percent relative to non-HtM households, and lower income
levels of 12 percent. Meanwhile the associated reduction for W-HtM households is
not significant from zero for consumption, but associated with 5 percent lower income
levels. This is suggestive evidence that borrowing constraints are more likely to be
binding for P-HtM, since it is associated with lower consumption. We also see that the
coefficient on the poor hand-to-mouth dummy decreases income by a lesser amount in
the recession period, by 6 percent compared with 8 percent. The coefficient on the
poor hand-to-mouth dummy decreases consumption by a lesser amount in the recession
period, 13 to 12 percent. Overall, it suggests that the consumption to income ratio in
the poor hand-to-mouth sample increased over the recession period, suggesting the
average propensity to consume rose in this group.
Table 3.6 First Stage Regressions
log(ĉit) log(ŷit)
2003-2007 2009-2013 2003-2007 2009-2013









Education=Medium 0.034∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Education=High 0.105∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Race=Black −0.045∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Race=Other −0.009 −0.004 −0.047∗∗ −0.053∗∗
(0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.015)
Family Size 0.069∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Number of Kids −0.047∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Status=Unemployed −0.028∗ −0.058∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.019) (0.017)
Status=Retired −0.055∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
Status=Inactive −0.061∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Extra Family Income 0.012∗ 0.003 0.027∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Region=Midwest −0.043∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.053∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Region=South −0.027∗∗ −0.033∗∗ −0.032∗ −0.038∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012)
Region=West −0.022∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Kids outside Family Unit 0.025∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008)
Poor-HtM −0.078∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
Rich-HtM −0.005 −0.012 −0.053∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Total Wealth ($1000s) 0.0002∗∗ 0.0004∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Constant 11.383∗∗∗ 11.668∗∗∗ 11.731∗∗∗ 11.693∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.052)
Year of Birth Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 13,281 14,820 13,281 14,820
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Survey-weighted generalised least squares regression for the years 2002, 2004, 2006 (columns 1 and
3) and 2008, 2009, 2011 (columns 2 and 4) in the PSID
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Table 3.7 details the results of the instrumental variable regression estimating the
marginal propensities to consume across the whole distribution over the pre-recession
and recession periods - giving an estimate of the aggregate MPC. The findings for the
marginal propensity to consume are in line with other empirical evidence, suggesting
that the MPC out of transitory income is non-zero, a result which is significant at
1%. The results suggest that on average, households consumed 10% of a transitory
income shock over the pre-recession period 2002-06, and this increased to 16% in the
recession period, 2008-12. The difference in the estimated MPCs is also significant at
1% over the pre-recession and recession periods. I also include as a robustness check an
estimate of the implied marginal propensity to save, where saving is defined as income
minus consumption, so we should find MPC ≈ 1-MPS. The marginal propensity to
save implied by yi,t − ci,t is not exactly equal to 1 − ∆ci,t due to measurement error,
but the rough approximation holds, as does the trend over the recession.






Turning to the estimates over the income distribution, tables 3.8 and 3.9 reports
the regression output over the pre-recession and recession periods which figure 3.22
shows graphically. On the left of figure 3.22, the MPC is downward sloping, implying










































Year ● ●2007 2013
Fig. 3.22 Empirical Distribution of MPC and implied MPS by year and quintile
Estimated marginal propensity to consume (left) and marginal propensity to save (right) by income quintile and time: pre-recession
period (2002-2006) , recession (2008-2012)
35% of a transitory income shock, this reduces down to a value that is not signifi-
cantly different to 0% for the highest income quintiles. Note that we see downward
sloping relationship between MPC and income despite controlling for borrowing con-
strained households, a factor which is known to generate such a relationship. This
is suggests that there is an certainly an important role for another mechanism to
create heterogeneity in the MPC over the distribution of income. One such mech-
anism that was discussed in chapter 2 - heterogeneous preferences in the form of
discounting - is certainly not ruled out as a candidate by these results - assuming
that heterogeneity in discounting is not perfectly captured by observable characteristics.
Lastly, and most significantly for this study, we see that the MPC over the quintiles
did not exhibit a significant upward shift or a steepening near the origin over the
pre-recession to recession period. We also see the same result on the balanced panel
(see appendix C.1), so differences in preferences across the two samples is not driving
the result. This result is more consistent with the narrative of a movement along the
consumption function generating higher aggregate MPCs. Such a movement, I have
argued, is more consistent with an interaction of a downward-sloping consumption






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this chapter, I argued that over the Great Recession, rising aggregate marginal
propensities to consume could best be explained by two mechanisms according to the
standard incomplete markets model of heterogeneous agents. Either the cause was an
interaction between falls in wealth and a concave, but static, consumption function; or
an increased variance in transitory shocks leading to a shifted consumption function.
I estimated the marginal propensity to consume out of transitory income over the
pre-recession and recession periods and over the quintiles of the distribution. I provided
evidence that the MPC varies greatly over the distribution of income, with income-
poor housholds consuming around 35% of a transitory income shock and income-rich
housholds consuming none. These results certainly accord with the large range of
estimates of MPC found in different datasets and components of consumption and
provides a motivation for heterogeneity in discount factors. The estimates also showed
that the consumption function did not change significantly over the pre-recession and
recession periods, suggesting that the first explanation, the interaction between a
concave consumption function and a fall in wealth across the distribution, is more
plausible. Of course, due to the presence of significant sampling variation inherent
in surveys we don’t have the power to distinguish between a very small shift in the
consumption function and no change at all. However, what is certain is that the
magnitude of the shift in the consumption implied by a standard incomplete markets
heterogeneous agent model that is calibrated to the wealth distribution in the pre-
recession and recession periods, shown in chapter 2, is far too high to be consistent
with the evidence presented in this chapter. This leaves an open question for future
research, in terms of reconciling the empirical dynamics of the wealth distribution over
the cycle with models of heterogeneous agents.
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A. Chapter 1 Supplementary Material
A.1 Marginal Effects and Decomposition of the Tobit Model
A.1.1 Marginal Effects
The Tobit model can be expressed as:
yi =

Xiβ + ui, if Xiβ + ui > 0
0, otherwise
where i = 1, 2, ..., N with N the number of observations, yi is the dependent variable.
X is a vector of independent variables, β is a vector of coefficients and u ∼ N(0, σ2) is
the error term.
Unlike in an OLS regression, the marginal effect in equation 1.4 of the main text
has to be separately calculated. While in an OLS regression the marginal effect is
simply ∂E(y|X)
∂Xj
= βj, in Tobit the marginal effect can be written as follows:
∂E(y|X)
∂Xj
= P (y > 0|X)βj (A.1)
To get an estimate of the marginal effect, we assume a standard normal distribution
of the data and we maximise the log-likelihood function of the tobit model w.r.t β
and σ2. This will yield maximum likelihood estimates and, assuming that we have
specified the model correctly, it will give us consistent and asymptotically efficient
estimators for both β and σ2. We can then use β̂ and σ̂ to estimate the function
P (y > 0|X). Using the appropriate expression for the standard normal distribution,
we obtain P̂ (y > 0|X) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 F (Xiβ̂/σ̂), where F (.) is the CDF of a standard












Thus, for the purpose of interpretation of marginal effects, all coefficients that appear
in the regression tables have to be multiplied by the APE scale factor to obtain the
estimated marginal effect.
A.1.2 Decomposition of the Tobit Model
Tobin (1958) shows that for the Tobit model the expected value of y is:
E(y|X) = XβF (z) + σf(z) (A.2)
where z = Xβ/σ, f(z) is the unit normal density and F (z) is the corresponding
CDF.
Furthermore, the expected value of y for observations above the limit, y > 0, is Xβ
plus the expected value of the truncated normal error term (see Amemiya (1973)):
E(y|X, y > 0) = E(y|X, u > −Xβ)
= Xβ + σ f(z)
F (z) (A.3)
From A.2 and A.3, the relationship between E(y|X) and E(y|X, y > 0) is simply:
E(y|X) = F (z)E(y|X, y > 0) (A.4)
From A.3, taking the partial derivative with respect to the jth independent variable
Xj and noting that F ′(z) = f(z) and f ′(z) = −zf(z) gives:
∂E(y|X, y > 0)
∂Xj
= (1 − zf(z)/F (z) − f(z)2/F (z)2) ∗ βj (A.5)
From which (1 − zf(z)/F (z) − f(z)2/F (z)2) gives the fraction of the mean total
response is due to the response above the limit, equation 1.6.1 in the main text. Taking
the partial derivative of A.4 with respect to Xj gives:
∂E(y|X)
∂Xj
= F (z)∂E(y|X, y > 0)
∂Xj




which, using the fact that F (z) = P (y > 0|X) and ∂F (z)/∂Xj = (βj/σ)F (z) we









Following McDonald and Moffitt (1980), using the estimates of β and σ we can get












B. Chapter 2 Supplementary Material
B.1 The Krusell Smith Algorithm (KSSim)
KSSim finds the coefficients of the parametrised policy rules for individual agents by
using time iteration, a projection technique I will describe below. It then separately
finds the parameters of the aggregate laws of motion using data simulated by using
these individual policy rules. It compares the consistency of the two using an ordinary
least squares projection.
B.2 Solving the Individual Problem with Time Iteration
Just as the Bellman equation has an associated operator that maps value functions into
value functions, the Euler equation has an Euler operator that maps policy functions
into policy functions. Although the Euler equation is not a contraction mapping like
the Bellman, it can be shown that an iterative procedure on the Euler equation, known
as time iteration, is equivalent to value function iteration; computationally it is a much
more efficient technique.
To form the time iteration problem we start with equation 2.8a and substitute
out for c′ using the budget constraint. Then we can find functions that satisfy the
functions k′ = gk′(k, e, z, K̄;ϕ) and λ = gλ(k, e, z, K̄;ϕ) according to:





[(1 + r′ − δ)Uk′((1 + r′ − δ)k′
+ [(1 − τ ′)l′e′ + µ(1 − e′)]w′ − gk′(k′, e′, z′, K̄ ′;ϕ))
(B.1)
where Uk′ is the derivative of U with respect to k′, The policy function and Lagrange
multiplier must satisfy the complementary slackness conditions, λ ≥ 0, k′ ≥ 0 and
λk′ = 0. However, solving B.1 involves having to solve jointly for the policy function
and Lagrange multiplier. To circumvent the need for this, we drop the multiplier. The
Appendix B
policy function obtained may violate the constraint k′ > 0, but the algorithm deals
with this by simply forcing the capital choices to take positive values. Using this trick,










(1 + r′ − δ)
((1 + r′ − δ)k′ + [(1 − τ ′)l′e′ + µ(1 − e′)]w′ − gk′(k′, e′, z′,M ′;ϕ))
]
This equation provides the basis for the time iteration algorithm. To apply this
method in practice, we must prespecify a grid of possible values for k to take and
solve the right hand side (RHS) of B.1 for each one of the nodes of the grid. The















. This is retrieved by updating








(1 − L(z))πe′g ,z′|eb,zK̂eb + L(z)πe′g ,z′|eg ,zK̂e
L(z′)
In words: the first equation is the average capital stock of unemployed agents next
period is the aggregated primary auxilliary policy rules (PAPRs) of the unemployed
agents this period plus the aggregated PAPRs of employed agents this period who
become unemployed next period, divided by the number of unemployed next period.
The second says that the average capital stock of employed agents next period is the
aggregated PAPRs of the unemployed agents who become unemployed next period,
plus the aggregated PAPRs of those who remain employed, all divided by the number
of employed next period.
Having solved the RHS, we can recover the endogenous values of end of period k,
kend, associated with each of these points to construct endogenous grid points (see
below for a discussion of this method). Then this period’s individual policy function
is constructed using a one-dimensional piecewise linear spline over kend. Finally, for
each e ∈ E and z ∈ Z, the individual policy function for k′e,z is approximated by a
three-dimensional piecewise linear spline in Ke, Ku and kend. The algorithm then
compares the k′e,z with the last iteration’s value for k′e,z. If the two are within a
Appendix B
prespecified error tolerance level, ϵk, then we say that a stationary policy has been
found. Otherwise the individual problem begins again.
B.2.1 The Method of Endogenous Grid Points
Maliar et al. (2010) use the method of endogenous grid points when solving the
individual problem. The grid points are endogenous in the sense that we do not have
to specify some grid of values and then use a rootfinding algorithm to find the value of
c that solves equation B.1. This is a useful technique because rootfinding algorithms
are exceptionally slow.
The method works because any arbitrary value of k, call it ki, will be associated
with a marginal valuation at the end of the current period, and it is easy to find the
value of c that gives the same marginal value. Construct the end of period’s marginal
value function Vk′(k, e, z, K̄) as the right hand side of equation B.1, but with updated
employment statuses (since some agents change employment status during the period).
Then we can find the value of c that gives the same marginal valuation as:
U ′(c) = Vk′(k, e, z, K̄)
=⇒ c = U−1(Vk′(k, e, z, K̄))
= Vk′(k, e, z, K̄))−1/σ
and, using the values just found, we can also retrieve a value for k consistent with this
marginal valuation. These new grid points for k are the endogenous individual capital
grid, kend.

C. Chapter 3 Supplementary Material
C.1 MPC on a Balanced Panel in the PSID
This appendix contains the first- and second-stage regressions in the main text repeated
on a balanced panel. In other words, while the main text allowed different households
over the pre-recession and recession periods, this appendix keeps only households that
have non-missing data for the full 2002-2012 period. The estimated equations are
the same, and the results are qualitatively identical and quantitatively very similar.
































Year ● ●2007 2013
Fig. C.1 Estimated Distribution of MPC year and quintile, balanced panel
Estimated marginal propensity to consume by income quintile and time, balanced panel: recession


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table C.3 First Stage Regressions
log(ĉit) log(ŷit)
2003-2007 2009-2013 2003-2007 2009-2013









Education=Medium 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Education=High 0.111∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
Race=Black −0.047∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Race=Other −0.009 −0.015 −0.053∗ −0.076∗∗
(0.022) (0.012) (0.024) (0.018)
Family Size 0.068∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of Kids −0.045∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Status=Unemployed −0.074∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.010) (0.031) (0.019)
Status=Retired −0.059∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
Status=Inactive −0.069∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015)
Extra Family Income 0.017∗ 0.003 0.031∗∗ 0.028∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Region=Midwest −0.043∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.041∗ −0.059∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
Region=South −0.025 −0.037∗∗ −0.031 −0.043∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.020) (0.017)
Region=West −0.018 −0.048∗∗ −0.034∗ −0.059∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Kids outside Family Unit 0.022∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.005) (0.015) (0.010)
Poor-HtM −0.081∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Rich-HtM −0.012 −0.013 −0.066∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
Total Wealth ($1000s) 0.0002∗ 0.0003∗ 0.0005∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant 11.615∗∗∗ 11.659∗∗∗ 11.723∗∗∗ 11.666∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.035) (0.070) (0.079)
Year of Birth Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 8,373 8,373 8,373 8,373
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Survey-weighted generalised least squares regression for the years 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2011
(columns 2 and 4) in the PSID balanced panel.
